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1No Due Process:   
How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional Rights of the Family Members of 
Death Row Prisoners 
 
On May 25, 2001, Shakeerah Hameen stood behind a Plexiglass wall at the 
Delaware Correctional Center and watched as the state of Delaware dripped lethal 
chemicals into her husband, Abdullah Hameen, as he lay strapped to a gurney.  He was 
killed at midnight and buried before the day ended, but Shakeerah was too ill to attend his 
burial.  After watching the state kill her husband, she physically and emotionally fell 
apart.  She developed an intense migraine headache, had diarrhea, and had a bad asthma 
attack.  Her blood pressure skyrocketed.  Over the subsequent days she did not improve.  
The asthma turned into a bronchial infection and the diarrhea persisted.  Her breathing 
became so labored that she could not be alone.   
 For three months, Shakeerah was too ill to go to work.   Besides the physical 
illness, she teetered on insanity, barely able to function.  Although she was a devout 
Muslim, she was too depressed to pray.  After three months, Shakeerah returned to work, 
but she was too weak to work full-time.  In fact, Shakeerah never regained sufficient 
strength to return to work full-time.  Five years after the execution, the highly-talented 
and once vital woman still struggles to maintain herself and her family. 
 After Abdullah’s execution, his son, called “Little Hameen” by the family, 
attempted suicide with a drug overdose.  His depression and anger interfered with his 
ability to continue with his education.  He started getting into trouble with the law and 
ultimately was charged with capital homicide, the same as his father.1
1 Rachel King, CAPITAL CONSEQUENCES: FAMILIES OF THE CONDEMNED TELL THEIR STORIES, 87-122 
(Rutgers University Press 2005).   
2Unfortunately, these stories are not unique.  Since the death penalty’s 
reinstatement in 1976,2 an estimated 7,600 people have been sentenced to death.3
Researchers estimate that for every person on death row at least eight people, either 
family members or close kin, are closely affected by that sentence.4 Not all of the 
condemned prisoners have been, or will be executed, 5 but their families still suffer 
horribly from the process of a death penalty prosecution.   
 Many scholars and advocates have spent years developing theories to challenge 
the constitutionality of the death penalty from the point of view of the condemned person.  
These challenges have been brought primarily under the Eighth Amendment, but also 
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Some commentators 
have even suggested a substantive due process challenge to the death penalty.6 However, 
no one has yet to challenge capital punishment from the perspective of the family 
members who are intimately, and tragically, affected by the punishment.  This article 
 
2 The year 1976 marks the beginning of what is called the “modern era” of the death penalty in the United 
State.  In 1972, the Supreme Court struck down all death penalty statutes in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972), on the grounds that the way the penalty was administered was so arbitrary and unfair 
that it violated the Eighth Amendment.  As a result of that ruling, all prisoners on death row at that time had 
their sentences commuted to life in prison.  States quickly revised their capital punishment statutes and in 
1976 the court upheld some of the newly revised statutes in the case of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976), reinstating the death penalty.     
3 For years 1977-2004, see Capital Punishment Statistics, United States Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2006) available at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm; for 
2005, see Capital Case Data Project of the American Judicature Society (March 2006) available at 
http://www.ajs.org/jc/death//jc_death.asp.
4 Estimate by Professor Susan Sharp, a sociologist at the University of Oklahoma.   
5 According to the most recent statistics kept by the NAACP LDF:  1016 people have been executed since 
the resumption of executions, and 3377 people are on death row in the United States – 1,451 of those are in 
only three states:  California, Texas, and Florida.  See Death Row USA, NAACP LDF, April 2006 
available at:  http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=297.
6 Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty, By Risking Execution of the Innocent, Violate Substantive Due 
Process, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1359 (2004) and Daniel Bird, Life on the Line:  Pondering the Fate of a 
Substantive Due Process Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, (2003). The author 
would like to acknowledge that she relied heavily on these excellent articles.  See also Hugo Adam Bedau, 
Interpreting the Eighth Amendment:  Principled vs. Populist Strategies, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 789, 811-
813 (1996) (suggesting substantive due process challenges to the death penalty since Eighth Amendment 
challenges are failing).  These scholars use the right to life as the basis of the challenge, as opposed to the 
right to liberty that I am suggesting.   
3makes the case that the death penalty violates the constitutional rights of the family 
members of the death row inmates. 
 Part I establishes standing for the family members to sue.  There is a long line of 
Supreme Court precedent establishing a fundamental right to marry,7 to procreate and to 
live with ones’ family members.  I have summarized the holdings of these cases as “the 
right to family.”  This right has been articulated and protected by the substantive due 
process clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.  As such, it is protected by the 
most stringent of all constitutional standards – strict scrutiny.  The right to family can 
only be intruded upon if there is a compelling state interest, and even then the law must 
be narrowly tailored. The death penalty interferes with this “right to family” by 
irrevocably harming the family.  The harm occurs even if the family member is not 
executed.  Therefore, anyone who has a family member charged with a capital crime 
would have standing to claim a violation of his or her due process rights.     
 Part II sets forth the harm suffered by family members of capital defendants 
giving examples of how the death penalty harms parents, children, spouses, siblings and 
extended family.  The harm comes not just from the prosecution of the case, but from the 
greater community as well.  By labeling a person as worthy of death, the death penalty 
prosecution stigmatizes the death row families creating a situation whereby they 
experience shame and harm from the larger society.     
 Part III shows there is no compelling state interest because the death penalty has 
failed consistently over decades to fulfill the policy goals for which it exists, namely 
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and denunciation and vindication of legal order, 
 
7 The right to marry is limited to when there are only two individuals, see Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878) (holding religious practice does not prohibit prosecution for polygamy) and, in 
most states, when the two individuals are of the opposite sex.   
4which I am calling “restoration of societal norms.”  This failure is both penological and 
philosophical.   
 Part IV argues that lesser forms of punishment, such as lengthy prison sentences 
including life in prison without parole, are more narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal 
of punishing offenders, without causing the tremendous and irreparable harm to the 
family structure.   
 Part V addresses other issues such as who has standing to bring the claim, how 
would it be brought, and could the theory be applied to other types of punishment. 
 
I.  The Constitution Protects the Right to Marry, Procreate and Create a Family – it 
provides a protected “Right to Family”   
 
The Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution provide 
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.  
“Life” and “property” are terms that are more or less easily described, but the more 
amorphous concept is liberty.  Liberty is more than just freedom from unfair 
incarceration; it includes the right to pursue a life and protects certain fundamental 
aspects of life, most especially the right to a family.     
 Family relationships are such an integral part of our legal system that family 
members are allowed to act on behalf of other members of their family in situations 
where that person cannot, or will not, act on his her own behalf.  For example, in Cruzan 
v. Missouri Department of Health, the parents of Nancy Cruzan petitioned to have life 
support removed from their comatose daughter.8 Similarly, family members frequently 
act as “next-of-friend” bringing appeals on behalf of death row prisoners who have 
 
8 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  Although the Court denied the Cruzan’s petition on substantive grounds, there was 
never any challenge to their legal standing to act on their daughter’s welfare.   
5chosen not to continue them.9 Again, this shows that family members have a legal 
interest in the welfare of the person on death row that courts have consistently 
recognized.   
 Indeed, the family relationship is such a fundamental core aspect of our legal 
system that we take it for granted.  In a long line of cases, stretching back nearly a 
century, the Supreme Court has articulated an evolving jurisprudence that defines the 
parameters of the right to family that is a liberty interest protected by the substantive due 
process clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.  
 
1.  The Substantive Due Process Clause Protects the Parent/Child Relationship 
 
The general parameters of this Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty interest were set 
out in Meyer v. Nebraska,10 a case that dealt with a statute that forbade teaching German 
in public schools.11 On its face, one would not think that a law forbidding foreign 
language instruction would implicate constitutional rights, but in striking down this law, 
the Court used the case to set forth the liberty rights protected by the substantive due 
process clause, recognizing the right to “marry, establish a home, and bring up children.12 
The Court said: 
While this [C]ourt has not attempted to define with exactness the 
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and 
some of the included things have been definitely stated.  Without 
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
 
9 Family members frequently seek to act on behalf of condemned death row prisoners who have chosen to 
give up their appeals.  Courts typically permit family members, or other close associates, to act on behalf of 
prisoners when they are incompetent to make the decision to end their appeals.  See for example, Dennis v. 
Budge, 378 F. 3d 880 (9th Cir. 2004); Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1998); Commonwealth 
v. Haag, 809 A.2d 271 (Pa. 2002).  
10 262 U.S. 390 (1923)  (Court struck down a statute that forbid teaching German in public schools on 
grounds that it violated a parents’ liberty interest in planning their children’s education). 
11 In another education-related case, the Court upheld the right of parents to educate one’s child as they 
choose.  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1923).   
12 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.   
6right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry to establish 
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates 
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of free 
man.  The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered 
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative 
action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some 
purpose within the competency of the state to effect.  Determination by 
the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is 
not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts.13  
 
This seminal case gives standing to family members to challenge laws that implicate the 
family, and established the supremacy of the courts to review the states’ use of police 
power in those situations that interfered with the family relationship.  In Meyer the 
parents had standing to sue because of their interest in their relationship with their 
children, and their interest in what happened to their children.   
 Similarly, the parents of death row inmates have an interest in what happens to 
their children.  Of course, the rights of the parents to make important decisions regarding 
their children do not trump the rights of the state in all instances, but the Supreme Court 
made it clear in Meyer that the police power must be narrowly tailored, and it is the duty 
of the Court to oversee that authority to make sure that the legislative action is not 
“arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the 
state to effect.”14 As will be demonstrated later, the manner in which the death penalty is 
applied is arbitrary and therefore is not a reasonable relation to the purpose for which it is 
in effect.     
 
13 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (citations omitted).      
14 Id. 
7The parameters of the parent child relationship were explored in a series of child 
custody cases starting with Stanley v. Illinois.15 In this case, a natural father, who had 
raised his children from birth with the mother of the children (to whom he was not 
married), lost custody of his children, without a hearing, after the mother died under an 
Illinois statute that presumed that since he had not married the mother he was, ipso facto, 
an unfit parent.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the due process clause 
mandated that Stanley be entitled to a full custody hearing.16 
Stanley’s right to have a relationship with his children stemmed both from the fact 
that he was the children’s biological father, but also from the fact that he had been living 
with the children and raising them.17 The Court found that Stanley’s parental relationship 
was entitled to substantive due process protection.  Similarly, the strength of the 
relationship between parents and their children, even if one or the other of them is on 
death row, should be entitled to protection under the substantive due process clause.   
 
2.  The Substantive Due Process Clause Protects the Right to Marry and Procreate  
In the later part of the 20th century, the cases addressing the “right to family” have 
evolved largely in the context of expanding privacy rights associated with marriage, 
procreation and sexuality.  In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court addressed the issue of 
whether a state could pass a law requiring mandatory sterilization for third time felony 
 
15 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
16 Id. at 657-58.   
17 In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia law that permitted a stepfather to adopt the 
child of his wife without first obtaining the consent of the natural father, when the natural father had had an 
intermittent relationship with his child but had never sought to obtain legal custody of him.  Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).  (“Best interest of the child” overrode a natural father’s right to block 
adoption of his child when the child wanted to be adopted by the stepfather and had been living with him 
and his mother for nine years).     
8offenders.18 In striking down the statute the Court stated, “We are dealing here with 
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.  Marriage and procreation 
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”19 
The right to marry, and to enjoy a marital relationship without interference from 
the state, was addressed in Griswold v. Connecticut.20 In a slightly different twist, the 
Court upheld the right of a married couple not to procreate and struck down a law which 
prohibited a married couple from using contraceptives on the grounds that it unduly 
burdened marital privacy.  The Court stated that the rights guaranteed in the Bill of 
Rights are themselves protected by “penumbras, formed by emanations” that gave the 
rights “life and substance.”21 Prohibiting the use of contraceptives impeded several 
fundamental constitutional rights that had a “maximum destructive impact upon that 
relationship.”22 In describing the marriage relationship, the Court wrote: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older 
than our political parties, older than our school system.  Marriage is a 
coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate 
to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way 
of life, not causes; a harmony of living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet is an association for as 
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.23 
The right to marry was again affirmed in Loving v. Virginia, where the Court struck down 
a miscegenation statute, once again affirming, “The freedom to marry has long been 
 
18 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
19 Id. at 541.   
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965).   
21 Id. at 484. 
22 Id. at 485. 
23 Id. The right to use contraceptives was extended to non-married people in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438 (1972).   
9recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness.” 24 
The fundamental right to marry was the rationale for striking down mandatory 
leave laws for pregnant women25 and a law that required a non-custodial parent, who was 
under a court order to pay child support, to get court approval before marrying.26 
The legal, and moral, sanctity of a marriage does not end just because a person is 
charged with a capital crime or sentenced to death.27 A convicted offender may lose his 
liberty rights to the extent that the state may incarcerate or execute him, but the state has 
no interest in terminating the marriage relationship, even if one member of the couple is 
on death row.  The death row family member should have standing to challenge the death 
penalty on the grounds that it interferes with the sanctity of their family relationship.      
 
3.  The Substantive Due Process Clause Protects the Sanctity of the Family  
 
The Court further articulated the “right to family” in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland28 when it struck down a housing regulation that limited occupants of a single 
family dwelling to people recognized as members of the immediate family.  Mrs. Moore 
was prosecuted for living with her son and two grandsons in violation of a city housing 
ordinance, which she argued violated her substantive due process rights.  The city urged 
the Court not to “expand” substantive due process rights noting that nothing in prior case 
 
24 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
25 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFluer, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).   
26 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)(striking down a Wisconsin statute that required a person 
paying child support to obtain court approval before marrying).   
27 I know of no instances where a marriage was ended because a person was sent to prison or death row.  
Indeed, a prisoner has a constitutionally-protected right to marry even after he is incarcerated.  Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).   
28 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
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law “gives grandmothers any fundamental rights with respect to grandsons.”29 The Court 
disagreed that it was “expanding” substantive due process rights, stating that: 
[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing 
arbitrary lines but rather from careful respect for the teachings of 
history (and), solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our 
society.  Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the 
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.  It is through the 
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished 
values, moral and cultural.30 
Again, the Court reaffirmed the right to family as a cherished cultural value, and at the 
same time made it clear that this right did not only apply to the immediate nuclear family, 
but extended to grandparents (and presumably other extended family relationships) as 
well.    
 The Supreme Court has addressed the sometimes conflicting values between the 
rights of biological family members versus those living together as a family.  A decisive 
case discussing these conflicting rights was the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.31 While 
married to Gerald D., Carole gave birth to a child, Victoria, fathered by Michael H., with 
whom she had been having an adulterous affair.  For the next several years, Carole and 
Victoria lived at various times with Gerald D. and Michael H., both of whom held the 
child out to be their daughter.  Eventually, Carole settled down with her husband Gerald 
and had two other children with him.   
 Michael H. sought custody and visitation with Victoria, who was indisputably his 
biological daughter, and with whom he had established a relationship.  Under California 
law, if a child was born to a married couple, it was presumed to be a child of the 
 
29 Moore, 431 U.S. at 500. 
30 Id. at 503.   
31 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
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marriage, and only the husband or wife had standing to challenge the legitimacy of the 
child, except in limited circumstances.   
 Michael H. argued that the California statute violated his substantive due process 
right to a relationship with his child.  The Court disagreed.  In upholding the statute, the 
Court looked at history and tradition as the basis for determining questions of substantive 
due process.  Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Scalia, pointed out that historically the 
family unit had been protected; whereas there was no tradition or history of protecting 
biological fathers who had children out of wedlock. 32 
[T]he legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the 
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria 
has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices 
of our society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded 
special protection.  We think it impossible to find that it has.  In fact, 
quite to the contrary, our traditions have protected the marital family 
against the sort of claim Michael asserts.”33 
In the cases post Michael H., the Supreme Court has begun placing more and more 
emphasis on the importance of examining history and legal traditions in cases where the 
parties assert substantive due process rights.  In Washington v. Glucksberg, 34 four 
physicians and a group of terminally ill patients challenged Washington State’s law that 
banned assisted suicide on the grounds that it violated substantive due process.  In 
upholding Washington’s ban on assisted suicide, the Court wrote a lengthy, detailed 
analysis of the history of laws prohibiting suicide and assisting suicide, and articulated a 
test for determining substantive due process claims:  
 
32 In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that Scalia’s methodology of defining fundamental interest was 
misguided.  He suggested that the “tradition” at issue was that of parenthood, not the “tradition” of raising 
children in an intact nuclear family.  Brennan suggests that had the issue been framed differently, Michael 
H. would have prevailed.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J. Dissenting).    
33 Id. at 124.   
34 521 U.S. 702 (1997).   
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Our established method of substantive due process analysis has two 
primary features:  First, we have regularly observed that the Due 
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed.”  Second, we have required in substantive due 
process cases a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental 
liberty interest.”  Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices 
thus provide the crucial “guideposts for responsible decision 
making,” that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process 
Clause.  As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment 
“forbids the government to infringe… ‘fundamental’ liberty interests 
at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”35 
The families of death row inmates meet all the requirements set forth in Glucksberg, and 
their “right to family” should be protected by the substantive due process clause.   
Conclusion 
 
As the above cases illustrate, the right to family, which includes the right to 
marry, procreate, or not, and live with family members, is deeply rooted in our nation’s 
history and tradition.  It is a right that is recognized by all members of the Supreme Court 
from the most liberal to the most conservative.  The families of death row prisoners have 
rights protected by the substantive due process clause, which meet the test articulated in 
Glucksberg.36 They have a right to have a relationship with their family member, be it 
spouse, parent or extended family member, a right that is deeply rooted in our nation’s 
history.  This right has been carefully described and defined in a series of Supreme Court 
cases stretching back nearly a century.37 
35 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719.   
36 Id. 
37 The issue of how to “carefully describe rights” came into play in the recent opinion from the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in the case of Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs vs. Andrew 
von Eschenbach and Michael Leavitt, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  In Abigail Alliance, the plaintiffs 
sought access to Phase II experimental cancer drugs on the grounds that they had a substantive due process 
right to have access to drugs that had been found during Phase I trials to be safe, but had yet been approved 
13
Family relationships are the powerful glue that holds together our society.  Those 
relationships are not diminished when one family member is no longer living physically 
with the others.   Children move away to college or join the service, spouses live 
separately from each other to pursue careers or other interests, grandparents leave their 
families to travel or live in warmer climes, but this physical separation does not make 
them any less of a family member.  So too, if a family member is separated because of a 
death sentence, that person is still a part of the family, and the family still suffers from 
the loss of that relationship.   
 When the state charges, prosecutes, convicts and executes a person the state is 
interfering with the constitutionally protected family relationships of that person.  The 
constitutional remedy is not limited to those families where a family member has been 
executed, nor is it limited to cases involving innocent family members.  The imposition 
of a death sentence, whether on an innocent or guilty person, irrevocably destroys family 
life.  Because a death sentence impinges on constitutionally-protected family 
relationships, the government must show a compelling state interest in order to justify the 
continued use of death penalty statutes.   
 
for commercial distribution.   The District Court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ case on a summary judgment 
motion, but the D.C. Circuit Court reversed.  The majority opinion stated that a terminally ill patient has a 
substantive due process right to access experimental drugs that could potentially save her life.  Under 
Glucksberg, the majority described the right as “a right of control over one’s body” that “has deep roots in 
common law.”  Id. at 480.  The dissent disagreed.  It stated that there is no “right” to have access to 
experimental drugs, and that under Glucksberg, lower courts have no constitutional authority to expand 
substantive due process “rights.”   This opinion points out a flaw in Glucksberg, which is who decides how 
to define the right at stake.  Regardless of the ultimate outcome of Abigail alliance, the issue of who 
describes the right is not a concern with my theory, because the right to pursue family relationships has a 
long history, and has been articulated in many different factual scenarios ranging from educating ones’ 
children (Meyer) to access to birth control (Griswold and Eisenstadt) to custody decisions (Michael H.).     
14
II. The Death Penalty Infringes Upon the Constitutionally-Protected Right to 
Family 
 
1. The Prosecution of Capital Cases Causes Physical and Emotional Trauma 
 
In order to determine whether the death penalty is sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
survive a substantive due process challenge, one must first determine the right to be 
protected, and then determine if the government interest is sufficient to justify 
interference with that right.38 Since the right to family has already been identified as 
worthy of substantive due process protection, this section examines how the death 
penalty interferes with those constitutionally-protected relationship.   
 There is not a large body of literature on the subject of the effects of the death 
penalty on families, but within the literature there is sufficient research to establish the 
harm done to families.39 There are no firm numbers, but one expert estimates that every 
person on death row (3,373 as of January 2006)40 has on average eight significant family 
relationships including children, spouses, parents, extended family and “fictive kin” (non-
family members who are so close to the prisoner that they are in effect, his family).41 
The decision to charge a person with a capital crime immediately isolates and 
condemns the family members of the defendant.  The stigma associated with such a 
 
38 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-22.   
39 This article relies on five sources for its information about the effect on the families of capital 
defendants.  Rachel King, CAPITAL CONSEQUENCES: FAMILIES OF THE CONDEMNED TELL THEIR STORIES,
(Rutgers University Press 2005) (documenting the experiences of nine families of capital defendants);  
Susan Sharpe, HIDDEN VICTIMS: THE EFFECTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON FAMILIES OF THE ACCUSED,
(Rutgers University Press 2003) (documenting the experiences of 52 family members of capital 
defendants); Elizabeth Beck, Brenda Sims Blackwell, Pamela Blume Leonard, and Michael Mears, Seeking 
Sanctuary:  Interviews with Family Members of Capital Defendants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 382 (2002-2003) 
(documenting the experiences of nineteen families of capital defendants); Rachel King, The Impact of 
Capital Punishment on Families of Defendants and Murder Victims’ Family Members, 89 JUDICATURE 
292,295 (2006); Rachel King and Katherine Norgard, What About Our Families?  Using the Impact on 
Death Row Defendants’ Family Members as a Mitigating Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing Hearings, 26 
FLA. ST. U .L. REV. 1119 (1999). 
40 See Death Penalty Information Center at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.   
41 Information provided by Professor Susan Sharpe. 
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charge causes intense hardship and irrevocably changes family relationships.  
Psychologist Katherine Norgard, whose son was sentenced to death, describes the 
experience as “chronic grief,” a never-ending painful saga with which most people 
cannot identify, which alienates the families even further.  The fact that her government 
was preparing to kill her child constantly weighed on her mind.  In grocery stores, at 
church, or community meetings, Norgard wondered if the people she was interacting with 
supported her child’s execution.42 She describes chronic grief as:  
a psychic wound that will not easily heal.  It is encased in shame, 
hopelessness, and isolation from community support.  Family members 
of the condemned are marginalized when their government decrees 
that the family’s loved one is dispensable and the machinery of the 
death penalty begins its slow grind toward the goal of execution. The 
ongoing loving bond between the family members and the condemned 
becomes invisible to others outside death row.   
Family members of the condemned experience repeated nightmares, 
sleepless nights, difficulty concentrating, impaired short-term memory, 
hypervigilance, a constant aching grief, and episodes of uncontrollable 
crying.  We try to avoid thinking about the death penalty so we might 
go on with out lives, but intrusive thoughts plague our every hour.  It is 
as though we have a huge D on our forehead marking us as members 
of a caste suffering from indelible despair. (Emphasis added.)43 
The harm caused by the death penalty is not limited to the judicial process.  The stigma 
and shame associated with a capital case results in ill treatment from the larger 
community.  One woman said that human feces was left at her doorstep.  Some people 
experienced harassment at work and others at church.44 A participant in Professor 
Elizabeth Beck’s study of family members of capital defendants stated: 
 
that she only felt safe on her side of the tracks, where other low-
income African Americans lived.  She was afraid when she had to 
 
42 Rachel King, The Impact of Capital Punishment on Families of Defendants and Murder Victims’ Family 
Members, 89 JUDICATURE 292, 295 (2006). 
43 King, supra note 1, at 3.   
44 Sharpe, supra note 39, at 120.  
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cross the tracks, particularly during the trial.  “I was scared too about 
being his mother. Like doomed.  You feel like somebody is going to 
do something to you[.]”45 
Beck found that helplessness was the overriding feeling people experienced.  She 
identified three themes experienced by all family members.  “Their inability to ensure 
that the defendant’s story was fully and accurately presented, their inability to address the 
victim’s family,46 and their inability to hire a high-powered lawyer.”47 
Many people lose the support of their friends and community.  One woman said 
that, “All my friends from Oklahoma just abandoned me.  They didn’t support me at all 
during the years, and when I came down for [my brother’s] execution, not one of them 
showed any support.  Not one of them called or came over, NOT ONE!”48 This woman 
developed high blood pressure, migraine headaches, depression and sleeplessness.49 
In addition to stigma, there is also the problem of what Norgard labels “chronic 
grief.”  The grief experienced by death row family members is unique because others 
don’t share the experience.  As Norgard wrote “People experiencing grief have support 
groups available to help them.  We have none.  There are books and articles to read to 
help people process the grief and understand their experience.  . . .  Poetry abounds about 
grief.  There is no poetry about the condemned.” Other researchers have also tried to 
 
45 Beck, supra note 39, at 408. 
46 The rules forbidding contact between the victim and defendant’s families can create painful rifts that 
interfere with the healing process.  Family members of capital defendants are often told that they may not 
have any contact with the victims’ family.  This prevents them from reaching out and apologizing or 
expressing sympathy to the victim’s family.  It is extremely awkward for the defendants’ families to sit in 
the courtroom day after day and not be able to reach out to the other family.  One father who did try to 
speak to the victims’ family was told by a victim’s advocate to return to his side of the courtroom. See 
generally Sharp.  Lois Robison, whose mentally ill son Larry had killed his next-door-neighbors, had been 
told for years not to contact the victims’ families.  One day Lois decided she had had enough and 
approached the family and told them how sorry she was.  The victim’s mother started crying and said that 
they had been waiting for years to hear that.  King, supra note 1, at 184-220.   
47 Beck, supra note 39, at 408.   
48 Sharp, supra note 39, at 37.   
49 Id. at 38.   
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describe this experience.  Some have called it “ambiguous loss” similar to that of family 
members of service personnel who are missing in action.50 Researcher Pauline Boss has 
coined the term “frozen sadness.”  “The person experiencing this is often in a cycle of 
hope and despair, due to the uncertainty of the situation.  The repetitive nature of this 
cycle is particularly destructive, in part because of its long-term nature.”51 
Sociologist Susan Sharp compares the pain that the death row family members 
experience with that of the murder victims’ family members, which in some ways is 
similar but in other ways is different.    
[T]heir pain is not one of immediate loss.  Instead, they experience 
immediate  horror and a long, slow loss.  Furthermore, they are 
frequently treated as if they  are also guilty.  When asked what they 
would like people to know, they overwhelmingly indicated that they 
were victims and yet they were treated as if they had committed the 
crimes themselves.”52 
One family member, who has a brother with multiple disabilities on death row, described 
what it is like for death row family members: 
I see families, who, like us, live with not only the sorrow and pain of 
what their loved one has done, but with an agony and profound sense of 
dread as we wait our loved one’s executions.  We know down to the last 
detail how they will be killed; we just don’t know the “when.”  We 
know that we are powerless to stop it, and we wonder if we will have the 
strength to bear it.  I’ve heard it said that those who are on death row 
will die a thousand deaths while waiting for their execution.  We know 
that we will also die a thousand deaths before our loved one is executed.  
We know that the weight of this punishment will be borne by those of us 
who will go on living. . . those of us who saw their value and knew that 
they were not just garbage to be thrown out.53 
50 Sharp, supra note 39 at 52. 
51 Id. at 163.   
52 Id. at 165.   
53 Id. at 169.   
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The death penalty destroys families of guilty people and families of innocent 
people.  Consider the story of Sandra54 whose brother was convicted for murdering his 
wife and spent eight years in prison before he was finally exonerated.  The children were 
left without parents and when no family members could care for them they were sent to 
foster care with another family.  The family was embarrassed and shamed by their loved 
ones’ imprisonment and death sentence.  Prior to the charge, the brother had had a home, 
cars and a boat, and did not qualify for a public defender.  He and his parents spent their 
life savings hiring two attorneys.  Unfortunately, like many families of capital 
defendants, they did not have the resources to hire highly skilled defense lawyers, so they 
hired lawyers who had no experience with representing capital defendants, which is akin 
to hiring an internist to do complicated brain surgery.  After the brother was convicted, 
and the family’s resources were depleted, he qualified for a public defender.  His new 
lawyer convinced the appellate court to reverse the conviction on the grounds that he had 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.  The brother was eventually acquitted at retrial.   
Sharp describes what it was like for the family: 
The trial was difficult for all family members.  Sandra was still 
overseas and had to wait for the news.  She had no support; her 
husband would not talk to her about it [her husband was in the military 
and was very concerned that his brother-in-laws’ legal problems would 
hurt his career], and he did not want her talking to others there because 
of concerns about his career.  Her aging parents, especially her mother, 
had to locate attorneys and do all the work because her sister became 
too upset to do anything.   
 . . .
Upon acquittal, he was free, but his and his family’s lives were 
destroyed.  His children were now part of another family.  His parents 
had spent most of their savings for retirement on his attorneys.  He was 
also unable to work steadily.  The years on death row had taken a toll, 
leaving him with emotional problems that  interfered with his stability.  
 
54 Sharp, supra note 39, at 112-115.  The name has been changed to protect her confidentiality.    
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He has received no compensation from the state for the ordeal that he 
and his family had undergone.55 
Sandra’s family is not unique.  Family members of death row defendants often 
experience extreme health problems related to the stress of the case.  One father of a 
death row prisoner experienced sky-rocketing blood pressure while his wife gained 60 
pounds, became suicidal and smoked so much that she ended up in the hospital with lung 
disease.56 Another mother became so ill she needed an organ transplant and ended up 
spending most of her time in a wheelchair.57 One sibling who attended a day of the trial 
came back so emotionally distraught that “it set her back ten years.”  Another sibling 
whose brother was convicted developed severe depression and an anxiety disorder and 
was eventually declared disabled.58 One woman, whose brother was on death row, 
developed asthma, migraine headaches, and bulimia.  Her mother has panic attacks, 
diabetes, asthma, lupus, and depression and has threatened to kill herself if her son is 
executed.”59 
11 of the participants in Professor Beck’s study suffered from serious depression. 
 
One participant described sitting in a room in the back of her house, where she 
 cried for hours.  A third participant explained that “there have been no good days” 
 since her son’s arrest, only bearable days.  She likened her experience to rape, 
 explaining, “A rape, that’s what you have been through, you feel so dirty, so 
 stupid, sub-human.”60 
Some turn to alcohol and drugs to numb the pain.  Karen’s cousin, Kevin Stanford, was 
sentenced to death.   The two were very close and had grown up like brother and sister.  
 
55 Sharp, supra note 39, at 113, 115.   
56 Id. at 32.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 40.   
59 Id. at 120.   
60 Beck, supra note 39, at 407.   
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Both had been subjected to sexual and physical abuse as children.  Karen had witnessed a 
babysitter forcing a dog to sexually penetrate Kevin.  This same “caregiver” forced the 
two young cousins to have sexual contact.  None of the information about Kevin’s abuse 
was given to the jury that made the decision to sentence him to death.  Karen described 
Kevin’s sentencing: 
My whole family watched the news on TV when Kevin was sentenced 
to death.  I just couldn’t believe it.  I thought about all the problems he 
had in his life and all the things that had never been addressed.  But 
that was too much for me, so whenever I thought about it too much I 
just kept drinking to blot it out.61 
Besides the trauma and chronic grief experienced by death row family members, 
many also experience tremendous fear.  In Professor Elizabeth Beck’s survey of family 
members of death row defendants she found that many of them were afraid of various 
aspects of the process:   
[T]hey feared that the trial was stacked against their loved one, and 
many assumed that racial prejudice or their social and economic 
status would negatively impact the trial process and outcome.  
Eleven family members feared defense attorneys or other members 
of the defense team.  Nine participants feared attorney incompetence.  
Others feared interactions with defense attorneys because they 
perceived the attorneys as hurtful and abusive.62 
Some families even fear going to trial because of the threat of a death sentence if their 
loved one is convicted.  Families distrusted that they would get a fair hearing in court, or 
in the court of public opinion.  With the threat of a death sentence hanging over a 
person’s head, many defendants chose to plead guilty to the crime in exchange for a life 
sentence instead of risking going to trial and facing a possible death sentence.  Beck and 
 
61 King, supra note 1, at 167.   
62 Beck, supra note 39, at 408. 
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her colleagues documented the phenomena of capital defendants pleading to cases instead 
of going to trial and risking a death sentence.  She explains:   
Three family members indicated that the threat of a death penalty 
was an impediment to presenting the defendant’s version of the 
offense, and family members watched helplessly as stories were not 
fully told or correctly represented.  In a patricide case, a mother 
wanted the jury to know what her son’s father had put him through 
in life.  However, her son’s attorneys were more concerned about 
avoiding a death penalty and persuaded her son to plead guilty.  She 
had hoped that by telling her son’s story fully, some good might 
have come out of the tragedy. She explained, “Look at the families 
out there that are going through something like what me and my 
children went through.  Another mother, whose son also pleaded 
guilty, said there were many things that happened the night of the 
murder that never came out and that it was the threat of the death 
penalty that made it impossible to risk a jury trial.  A mother whose 
son pleaded guilty explained, [“]If it had not been a death penalty 
case, it would have been completely different.  He would have gone 
to trial and had the opportunity to defend himself.  Because it was a 
death penalty case we had no choice but to take  a plea because the 
thoughts of losing him were so drastic.[”]63 
Also, the high profile nature of death penalty cases often skews media coverage against 
defendants.  Families fear speaking to the media because they feel that their side of the 
story is not accurately portrayed.  Some felt that the sensationalist treatment of the case 
may have influenced the outcome of the trial.  For example, a single shooting at a 
birthday celebration was characterized as “a birthday massacre.”64 One woman recounted 
the media showing a picture following the execution of her loved one that depicted the 
ambulance driver laughing as he transported the body.65 
63 Beck, supra note 39, at 409.   
64 Id. at 400.   
65 Id. 
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2.  The Death Penalty Harms Children 
 
There are no statistics on how many of the approximately 3,400 people on death 
row today, or the more than 1000 people executed during the modern era, have, or had, 
children.  Children suffer the most from the death penalty.  They are the most victimized 
by the death penalty because they had no ability to chose their parents, or control their 
parents’ actions, yet they are dependent on their parents, regardless of how dysfunctional 
they are.   The State’s execution of a parent is the ultimate act of violence against a 
child’s family.  An execution by its nature induces extreme trauma on a child and 
represents the exact type of harm states seek to protect children from through family law 
and the family court system.66 Beck and colleagues described the types of harm 
experienced by children of incarcerated parents: psychological trauma from parent-child 
separation; difficulty establishing healthy relationships; truancy, aggression, and 
withdrawal; and a decline in their social and financial conditions.67 Beck speculates that 
these problems are even more pronounced for the children of people on death row.68 
One particularly poignant case is that of Little Hameen, mentioned in the 
introduction.  His father, Abdullah Hameen, was executed in Delaware after a lengthy 
 
66 Over the past decade the effects of domestic violence on children have been well documented.  These 
effects include post traumatic stress disorder, increased risk of depression and anxiety, aggressive behavior, 
and difficulty complying with authority.  See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 557, 561-562 (Feb. 2006).  Cities and states throughout the country recognized the 
substantial effects of violence on children and have taken measures to protect children.   The City of New 
York attempted to institute a policy within the Administration for Children’s Services, the city’s child 
welfare agency, whereby the city would remove to foster care any child residing in a home where domestic 
violence occurred regardless of whether the children themselves were the subjects of the abuse.  See 
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y. 3d 357 (N.Y. 2004).  In further recognition of violence’s significant 
negative effects on children, only Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and four United States territories 
do not consider the presence of violence in the home when making child custody decisions.     Annette M. 
Gonzalez and Linda M. Rio Reichmann, Representing Children in Civil Cases Involving Domestic 
Violence, 39 FAM. L. Q. 197, 198 (Spring 2005).   
67 Beck, supra note 39, at 395.   
68 Id.
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incarceration.69 There was no doubt that Hameen was guilty of the crime – a shooting in 
the course of a drug deal.  During the time Hameen was incarcerated he had been a model 
prisoner.  He took advantage of every opportunity to educate and improve himself.  He 
started a peace group that brought together citizens from the community and prisoners to 
discuss important social issues.  He counseled juvenile offenders against pursuing a life 
of crime.  Most importantly, he did every thing he could possibly do to support and love 
his son and wife, including frequent visits, phone calls, and letters. 
 When the time came for his execution, many believed, including prison personnel, 
that the Governor would commute Hameen’s sentence to life in prison because of his 
extraordinary efforts at rehabilitation.  Yet, this did not happen and Hameen was 
executed in May of 2001. 
 Understandably angry, confused and deeply saddened, Little Hameen attempted 
suicide.   There were no programs available to help counsel him or assist him in obtaining 
an education or a trade.  If his father had been murdered by a person, rather than the state, 
Little Hameen would have been considered a victim, and would have qualified for certain 
services from the state.  As it was, he was not considered a victim.  He received no 
apology for the loss of his father and no sympathy from state officials or anyone else 
outside the immediate family.  Under normal circumstances, when a child loses a parent, 
that child is entitled to their parents’ social security benefits; but this is not the case with 
the children whose parents are executed.70 Insecure, angry, grieving and lost, it is not 
surprising that Hameen turned to street life and eventually ended up being charged with a 
capital crime, repeating the cycle of his father.     
 
69 King, supra note 1, at 87-123. 
70 Sharp, supra note 39, at 171.   
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While this is a dramatic example, it illustrates that the effect of the death penalty 
is not limited to the offender or the offender’s family.  People can disagree about the 
morality of Hameen’s execution, but his son did not deserve to suffer the way that he did.  
Even if society would like to ignore his rage we cannot afford to, because it turned to 
violence that affected others.   
 Many states do not even permit simple physical conduct between parent and 
child.  One mother described how painful it was to hear her daughter say that she wanted 
to sit on her father’s lap, which was not permitted by the prison.  The mother told Sharp: 
Seeing the pain in [the child’s] face and knowing that much of the 
anger she has inside is a result of her shame at having a dad that 
society finds worthless enough to want to eliminate, despite her love 
for him.  The death penalty is so cruel and confusing to these children 
who have parents on death row.71 
Perhaps the most poignant story is that of a Texas mother who begged prison officials to 
allow her to hold her son one last time before his execution, a request which was denied.  
After the execution, they let her hold his still warm, but lifeless, body.72 
Children sometimes experience harassment and threats at school.  In one 
particularly dramatic case, two children, the brother and sister of a capital defendant who 
were in ninth and tenth grade respectively, had to leave school because the principal 
feared for their lives.73 Other parents withdrew their children from school because of 
ongoing painful ridicule.74 
3.  The Execution Creates Additional Harm to the Families  
 
71 Sharp, supra note 39, at 152.   
72 Id. at 173 
73 Beck, supra note 39, at 399.   
74 Sharp, supra note 39, at 123.  
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The capital trial process is harmful to families, but not surprisingly, the execution 
is especially harmful, and perhaps most harmful to the mothers of death row defendants.  
One sister whose brother was executed reported that she lost her mother and her brother 
the same day.  Her mother withdrew from the world and was never the same again.  One 
mother died of a heart attack prior to her son’s impending execution; another collapsed 
after her son’s execution and within a year, died of heart failure.75 Another mother was 
in intensive care when her son was executed because she had attempted suicide after her 
last visit with him.76 A mother, who had already gone through the experience of losing 
another child, described the depression that she felt after her sons’ execution as so intense 
that she couldn’t get out of it.77 Another [mother] said, “I am very mad now.  I have a 
short fuse.  My personality is totally altered.”78 
Three participants in Sharp’s survey who had already had a child die of other 
causes said that their experience with their convicted sons on death row was more painful 
than the other losses.79 
Other family members experienced, “suicidal thoughts, functional impairment, 
chronic sadness, inability to feel pleasure, irritability, and physical symptoms.80 For 
some, the functional disability was complete.  One mother described how she could not  
do anything for years, even open her mail or pay a bill.  “I lost everything… I became a 
burden on my family.”81 
75 Sharp, supra note 39, at 36.  
76 Id. at 18.  
77 Beck, supra note 39, at 406.   
78 Id. at 407.   
79 Sharp, supra note 39, at 18.   
80 Id. 
81 Beck, supra note 39, at 406.   
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Participants also experienced physical symptoms such as, “the inability to control 
diabetes and high blood pressure, worsened emphysema, diverticulitis, massive heart 
attacks, and a rapidly spreading cancer.”82 Darlene Chambers, who witnessed her 
husband’s execution, beat the glass and screamed in pain and collapsed and was 
hospitalized for shock and exhaustion.83 
The stress often affects the entire family unit, seriously compromising its stability.  
In one family alone, the mother of the executed man died of heart failure within a year of 
his execution.  The sister developed high blood pressure, migraine headaches and 
depression.  Another sibling drinks alcohol all day long.  A niece is incapable of holding 
down a job because she sleeps all day long.84 
III.  The Death Penalty Cannot Survive a Substantive Due Process Challenge 
Because it Fails to Achieve its Stated Penological or Philosophical Goals 
 
The idea of challenging the death penalty on substantive due process grounds is 
not a completely novel concept.  Some scholars have suggested such a challenge, 85 and 
two courts have used it as a basis for declaring the death penalty unconstitutional.86 
These commentators and courts have all made the case that the death penalty violates the 
 
82 Beck, supra note 39, at 407.     
83 Sharp, supra note 39, at 87.   
84 Id. at 103.   
85 Hugo Bedau, Interpreting the Eighth Amendment:  Principled Vs. Populist Strategies, 13 T.M. COOLEY 
L. REV. 789, 812 (1996); Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty, By Risking Execution of the Innocent, 
Violate Substantive Due Process, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1359 (2004); and Daniel Bird, Life on the Line:  
Pondering the Fate of a Substantive Due Process Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1329, (2003).  These scholars use the right to life as the basis of the challenge, as opposed to the right to 
liberty that I am suggesting.  The author would like to acknowledge that her analysis borrowed heavily 
from this excellent and thoroughly researched article.   
86 Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975), in this pre-Gregg opinion, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court struck its death penalty on substantive due process grounds.  In United States v. Quinones, 
205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), Federal District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff  stated that “execution 
under the Federal Death Penalty Act, by cutting off the opportunity for exoneration, denies due process 
and, indeed, is tantamount to foreseeable, state-sponsored murder of innocent human beings,” rev’d, 313 
F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).    
27
substantive due process rights of the defendant.87 Challenging the death penalty from the 
perspective of the family members is a novel idea.   
 It is, however, a novel idea that has a strong legal basis.  The “touchstone” of 
substantive due process analysis is the “protection against arbitrary action of 
government.”88 Professor Bentele wrote, “[S]ubstantive due process analysis dictates an 
examination of the government’s objectives in engaging in activities that threaten the life 
and liberty of its citizens.  Only when the government can justify encroachment on 
individual life and liberty by reference to compelling societal goals, does it satisfy due 
process standards.”89 A rigorous examination of the modern death penalty shows that the 
government encroachment on liberty cannot be justified.   
 To undertake a substantive due process challenge, one must first consider the 
state’s objectives in using the death penalty law.  One must also take into account that 
“death is different” and as such is held to a higher form of scrutiny than other forms of 
punishment.90 In its post-Furman jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
several interests a state may have to support its practice of capital punishment including 
deterrence, 91 retribution,92 incapacitation, and denunciation and vindication of legal and 
 
87 In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that if a claim is governed by a 
specific provision of the Constitution, no substantive due process analysis should be undertaken.  Because 
many death penalty claims are grounded in the Eighth Amendment, claimants do not raise substantive due 
process claims.  In this situation, the family members do not have any Eighth Amendment rights since they 
are not being subjected to punishment themselves.  Therefore, an Eighth Amendment challenge would not 
bar their use of a substantive due process claim.   
88 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 
(1974)).   
89 Bentele, supra note 6, at 1367-68.   
90 R. George Wright, The Death Penalty and the Way We Think Now, 33 LOY.L.A.L., 533, 353 (2000).  
“Legions of commentators and courts note that death is different.”   
91 But see Donald L. Beschle, What’s Guilt (or Deterrence) Got to Do With it?:  The Death Penalty, Ritual, 
and Mimetic Violence, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487 (1997) for a discussion on how the real function of 
the death penalty is not to deter crime or to seek retribution, but it is to provide society with a ritualized 
killing, whose function is to reaffirm social norms.   
92 Bird, supra note 6, at 1367.   
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moral order.93 At least one commentator has suggested that Justice Scalia believes that 
vengeance is an acceptable rationale for the death penalty.94 However, even if true, that 
belief is not widely accepted as an appropriate rationale, so, I will not discuss it here.95 
Deterrence and retribution are the two most commonly cited reasons for the death 
penalty.96 Even in states where statutes or the state constitution have suggested that 
retribution is not a valid penological objective in a state, the state courts or legislatures 
consistently have read retributive interests into the law.97 
This section will examine each of the stated purposes of the death penalty – 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and denunciation and vindication of legal and 
moral order, which I am categorizing as “reaffirmation of societal norms.”   
 Most of the discussion focuses on retributive justice because it is the theory of 
punishment most central to discussions of the death penalty.98 Also, there is a large body 
of legal-philosophical literature that discusses retribution theory in the context of the 
death penalty.     
 
93 Bedau, supra note 6, at 812 citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 331 (1972)(Brennan, J., 
concurring).   
94 See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia’s Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 68 (1992).   
95 Some commentators believe that some of the justices have incorrectly confused vengeance and 
retribution in their writings about the death penalty, which has resulted in retribution theory not being given 
its due as a valid rationale for the death penalty.  Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided 
Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1180-82 
(2003).   
96 Deterrence recognizes the state’s “interest in preventing capital crimes by prospective offenders.”  
Deterrence is utilitarian in its purpose, seeking “social benefits through the use of punishment as a means.”  
The theory is that “the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out 
murderous conduct.”  Repeatedly the Court has recognized deterrence as a valid interest and there is no 
sign of any abatement of that position.  Retribution recognizes the state’s “interest in seeing that the 
offender gets his ‘just deserts.’” Retribution is not a utilitarian interest; rather it “is directed at imposing 
merited harm upon the criminal for his wrong…” Retribution is distinct, however, from retaliation and 
vengeance.  “The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the 
administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society 
governed by law.” Bird, supra note 6, at 1367. 
97 Id. at 1367-1368.   
98 B. Douglas Robbins, Resurrection From a Death Sentence:  Why Capital Sentences Should be 
Commuted Upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1130 
(2001).   
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1.  The Manner in Which the Death Penalty is practiced does not Accord with 
Principles of Retributive Justice 
 
Many justices, criminologists, philosophers and lay people believe that retribution 
is a legitimate rationale for capital punishment.  The central notion of retributivism is that 
criminals deserve punishment, which justifies its infliction.99 Kant believed that 
punishment must never be used to promote “some other good for the criminal or civil 
society,” but must “in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has 
committed a crime.”100 Professor Dan Markel has defined retributive justice as follows: 
Retributive justice is to communicate certain ideals to an offender 
convincingly determined to have breached a legitimate legal norm.  
The social project of retributive justice possesses a good that has its 
own internal intelligibility and attractiveness, independent of what 
consequences follow.  101 
Punishing offenders may have other benefits, such as deterring others, but this is not a 
basis for punishment under retributivist theory.102 Retributive justice, which had fallen 
out of favor as a valid penological goal by the mid-70’s, enjoyed a resurgence at the end 
of the 20th century. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and former Chief Justice Rehnquist, are great 
believers in retributivist theory.  In his dissent in Morgan v. Illinois,103 Scalia, joined by 
Rehnquist and Thomas, quoted Immanuel Kant, the intellectual father of modern 
retributivists.104 
Whoever has committed Murder, must die…. Even if a Civil Society 
resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of its members…the last 
Murderer  lying in the prison ought to be executed before the 
 
99 David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1627 (1992).   
100 Id. 
101 Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud:  A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 411 (2005).    
102 Robbins, supra note 98, at 1116.   
103 504 U.S. 719, footnote 6 (1992)(Scalia, J., Rehnquist, Chief J., and Thomas, J. dissenting).   
104 Hegel built upon Kant’s philosophy, and is also considered one of the “fathers” of retribution theory.” 
Hegel argues that “since life is the full compass of a man’s existence, the punishment [for murder]… can 
consist only in taking away a second life.”  Wright, supra note 90, at fn 119.   
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resolution was carried out.   This ought to be done in order that every 
one realize the desert of his deeds…105 
Even more moderate Justices, like Justice Stewart, believed, that if properly applied, the 
death penalty served the social purpose of retribution.106 
Superficially, the death penalty appears to be an appropriate means of 
accomplishing retribution.  However, some scholars challenge this notion.  They believe 
that the inequities associated with the implementation of the death penalty lessen its 
retributive appeal.107 For example, scholar Thom Bassett suggests that the problem of 
racial bias in the application of the death penalty in light of the McCleskey v. Kemp 
decision threatens to sever the connection between capital jurisprudence and moral 
theory.”108 In McCleskey the Court ruled that statistical evidence of racial discrimination 
in Georgia was not sufficient to raise an equal protection challenge to the administration 
of the death penalty;109 instead a defendant must establish intentional discrimination in 
his or her particular case, a nearly impossible burden to meet.  McCleskey effectively 
made it impossible for defendants to raise issues of racial discrimination in death penalty 
sentencing, and, according to Bassett, has had the result that the death penalty does not 
accord with the ideals of retributive justice.   
The law is a moral enterprise in that it inevitably entails thinking in 
terms of a discipline that philosophers call ‘moral philosophy,’ ‘moral 
 
105 David Niven and Kenneth Miller, Death Justice, unpublished manuscript (anticipated publication 
Northern Illinois University Press 2007) at 259-60.   
106 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.   
107 Markel, supra note 101, at 427.  Markel has described his ideals of retributive justice as “CCR,” which 
stands for “Confrontational Conception of Retribution.”  Instead of focusing so much on the idea of “just 
deserts,” Markel outlines three other principles:  “[F]irst, moral accountability for unlawful actions; second, 
equal liberty under law; and third, democratic self-defense.  On this view, punishment is attractive because 
it effectuates certain ideals that are widely understood and embraced by citizens of complex liberal 
democracies such as ours.  Conversely, when a liberal democracy fails to create credible institutions of 
criminal justice, it undermines our commitment to these principles, though not under all circumstances.” 
108 Thom Bassett, Risking Cruelty:  McCleskey v. Kemp, Retributivism, and Ungrounded Moral Judgment, 
52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6 (2002).    
109 Id.  at 16.   
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reasoning,’ or ‘ethics.’  The criminal law in particular is a moral 
enterprise concerned with the bare minimum standards of socially 
acceptable behavior.  . . . As such, … the death penalty requires moral 
justification.  . . . [o]peration of the death penalty as sanctioned in 
McCleskey cannot be morally justified within the retributivist 
framework.110 
There are three basic tenets that Bassett argues are required for true retributive 
justice: the punishment must be proportionate, the punishment must accord with the 
“dignity of man,” and the punishment must be commensurate with what the offender 
deserves, i.e. “just deserts.”   
 The “just deserts” theory treats offenders as “moral actors” who have choice in 
their actions, and punishment should flow from those actions.111 Determining 
“seriousness” requires evaluating the harm done by the act and the degree of the actor’s 
culpability.112 Some believe that people sentenced to death, who go through a genuine 
experience of repentance and remorse, may no longer deserve to be executed.113 
Bassett references several philosophers, but primarily refers to Andrew von 
Hirsch.  According to von Hirsch, “punishment is justified if it manifests respect for a 
person, by expressing social condemnation of his freely chosen but wrongful conduct, 
and if it satisfied the requirements of cardinal and ordinal proportionality.”114 Cardinal 
proportionality “establishes an upper and lower limit of punishment and mandates 
different punishments for different crimes in light of the seriousness of the respective 
offenses.115 Ordinal proportionality requires that “persons convicted of crimes of 
comparable severity should receive punishments of comparable severity. . . . It follows 
 
110 Bassett, supra note 108, at 5.   
111 Id.  at 19.   
112 Robbins, supra note 98, at 1012.   
113 Id. at 1164.   
114 Bassett, supra note 108, at 18.   
115 Bassett, supra note 108, at 20.   
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that punishing one crime more severely than another expresses greater social disapproval 
of the first crime and is warranted only to the extent that it is more serious.”116 
The idea that punishment must accord with the “dignity of man” is a principle 
underlying Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  “A challenged punishment 
offends the dignity of man principle if it is excessive.  Examples of excessive 
punishments include those that make no ‘measurable contribution to acceptable goals of 
punishment,’ or exceed the proportionality of the crime, thereby offering nothing more 
than unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and suffering.”117 
Combining these three tenets of deserts, proportionality, and dignity of man, 
Bassett concludes that “A contemplated death sentence is morally impermissible unless 
and until it is reliably demonstrated that the offender deserves the punishment.118 He 
calls his proposition “The Condition of Reliable Demonstration of Desert,” which sets 
forth two principles necessary for imposition of the death penalty.   “(1) A contemplated 
punishment may be inflicted only after its appropriateness is reliably demonstrated; and 
(2) The more severe a contemplated punishment, the higher the degree of certainty of its 
appropriateness is required before it may be imposed.119 
Not all retributivists support such an egalitarian notion of retribution.  For 
example, Ernest van den Haag120 believes that if a person deserves the death penalty, i.e. 
 
116 Id. at 22.   
117 Seung Oh Kang, The Efficacy of Youth as a Mitigating Circumstance:  Preservation of  the Capital 
Defendant’s Constitutional Rights  Pursuant to Traditional Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 747, 752-753 (1994) citing Enmund, v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 592 (1977); and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).   
118 Bassett, supra note 108 at 33.   
119 Id. at 33-34.   
120 According to Professor R. George Wright, Ernest van den Haag is the “leading contemporary American 
advocate of the death penalty who was strongly influenced by the Kantian-Hegelian approach.”  Wright, 
supra note 90, at 566.  However, according to Laufer and Hsieh, despite his Kantian-style rhetoric, van den 
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the person was guilty of a crime worthy of death, then the fact that the punishment is not 
given to another person does not make it any less deserving of the person who received it.   
 
To put it starkly, if the death penalty were imposed on guilty blacks, 
but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed by a lottery among the 
guilty, this irrationally discriminatory or capricious distribution would 
neither make the penalty unjust, nor cause anyone to be unjustly 
punished, despite the undue impunity bestowed on others.121 
Similar to van den Haag, Christopher Meyers argues that a person selected to receive the 
death penalty on the basis of racial prejudice suffers no moral wrong because he already 
deserved a death sentence by virtue of his actions.122 However, as Bassett points out, 
Meyers fails to consider the fact that race distorts the sentencing process so that people 
who do not deserve the death penalty are sentenced to death.123 
The Court, at least rhetorically, has adopted the Bassett view of retribution, not 
the van den Haag/Meyer one.  The Gregg Court said, “Furman mandates that where 
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of 
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed 
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”124 
I am relying on Bassett’s paper, and the work of others, to demonstrate how 
problems in the implementation of the death penalty threaten the moral underpinnings of 
retributive justice.  Besides the problem of racial injustice identified by Bassett, the 
tremendous problem of innocent people being sentenced to death, as well as the fact that 
 
Haag did not fashion himself as a retributivist but, “found comfort in deterrence theory.”  William S. 
Laufer and Nien-he Hsieh, Choosing Equal Injustice, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 343 (2002).   
121 Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1663 (1986). 
122 Bassett, supra  note 108, at 13.   
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 12 citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-189  (1976)(stating that death sentences imposed 
under sentencing procedures that carried a “substantial risk” of arbitrary or capricious administration of 
capital punishment are invalid under Furman).   
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the death penalty is not imposed rationally amongst convicted murderers – it is not 
always imposed upon the most serious offender and is often imposed on those offenders 
that did not commit the worst crimes – are also reasons why the death penalty fails to 
achieve the goal of retributive justice. 
 A basic concept of criminal responsibility is that as punishment increases in 
severity, the justification for punishment must be more seriously and rigorously 
demonstrated.125 Because of the finality of the death penalty, it is held to a higher 
standard than other forms of punishment.126 As Justice Stewart wrote, “The penalty of 
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.  Death in 
its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison sentence differs 
from one of only a year or two.”127 As the following argument will demonstrate, the 
current manner in which the death penalty is administered fails to meet the requirements 
of Gregg, and fails to meet the requirements necessary for true retributive justice.128 
A.  Innocent People are frequently wrongly convicted 
 
There have been more than 120 people released from death rows because of 
innocence since Gregg.129 Statistics on exonerations indicate that there may be as many 
 
125 Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment:  A Critique of the Political and Philosophical Thought 
Supporting the Justices’ Positions, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 10 (1992).   
126 Likewise, because of the seriousness of killing another person, some believe that death is the only 
appropriate punishment to murder and that any length of imprisonment, no matter how long, is an 
inadequate response.  Wright, supra note 90, at 561.   
127 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 305.   
128 J. Michael Echevarria, Reflections on O.J. and the Gas Chamber, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 496 
(1995)(pointing out that the prosecution did not seek the death penalty against O.J. Simpson, even when the 
crime was a gruesome double homicide, was most likely due to the fact that  O.J. was a popular football 
hero and the prosecutors feared no jury would impose a death sentence, demonstrates the “arbitrary nature 
of the death penalty when it is sought on retributive grounds.”) 
129 Death Penalty Information Center, available at:  www.deathpenaltyinfo.org. 
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as one exoneration for every five to seven executions.130 These high numbers suggest 
that innocent people have been executed.  Indeed, according to one study, over 70% of 
the public believes that innocent people have already been executed – most likely in 
Texas.131 Frank Zimring, using an actuarial model examining the recent history of 
exonerations, concluded that the execution of the innocent is “all but inevitable.”132 
Historically, the problem of innocent people being executed has served as a strong 
motivator for jurisdictions to abandon the death penalty.  In 1847, Michigan became the 
first English speaking jurisdiction to abolish the death penalty after it was established that 
an innocent person was hung.133 Great Britain decided to abolish their death penalty laws 
after the revelation that an innocent person had been executed134 while the territory of 
Alaska and Canada abolished their death penalty under strong suspicion that innocent 
individuals had been executed.135 
Pre-modern era studies of innocence documented 23 individuals who may have 
been innocent and were executed in the past century.136 The same researchers argue that 
the number of wrongful convictions and executions has been underreported.137 
130 Jean Coleman Blackerby, Life After Death Row:  Preventing Wrongful Capital Convictions and 
Restoring Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (2003).    
131 Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the Crisis in the American Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information 
Center, September 2004, 5.  Available at:  www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
132 Bentele, supra note 6, at 1365.   
133 Beschle, supra note 91, at 530.   
134 Donald F. Paine, Impeachment by Bad Acts and Convictions: The Trials of Evans and Christie, 42 
TENN. BAR JOURNAL 27 (May 2006); Innocent available at 
www.innocent.org.uk/cases/timothyevans/timothyevans.pdf
135 Canadian Human Rights Commission, Human Rights in Canada: A Historial Prospective available at 
www.chrc-ccdp.ca/en/timePortals/milestones/70mile.asp ; Averil Lerman, The Trial and Hanging of 
Nelson Charles, ALASKA JUSTICE FORUM 13(1) (Spring 1996) available at 
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/f131sp96/a_nelson.html
136 Charles Lanier and James Acker, Capital Punishment, The Moratorium Movement, and Empirical 
Questions, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 577, 593 (2004) citing Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael Radelet,  
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 21 (1987).   
137 Id. at 593 citing Michael Radelet and Hugo Adam Bedau, The Execution of the Innocent, 6 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 105 (1998).   
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No one has yet been able to establish conclusively that an innocent person has 
been executed during the modern era.138 However, an innocent man died in prison before 
he was exonerated.  Frank Lee Smith was sentenced to death in Florida for a rape and 
murder for which he claimed to be innocent.  The state of Florida repeatedly denied his 
requests for DNA testing.  Smith died in prison from cancer while fighting for his 
freedom.  Posthumous DNA testing established his innocence, but this did little to help 
Smith who spent the last years of his life in prison condemned for a crime he had not 
committed.139 
Sister Helen Prejean, a nun who regularly serves as a spiritual advisor to death 
row prisoners, wrote a compelling book describing her experiences with Dobie Gillis 
Williams and Joseph O’Dell, whom she believed to be innocent.140 A June 2006 expose 
in the Chicago Tribune suggests that Carlos DeLuna, executed in Texas in 1989, was 
probably innocent.141 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has suggested that innocent people may be being 
executed and pointed to inadequate representation as part of the problem.   
If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some 
innocent defendants to be executed. . . .  People who get well 
represented at trial do not get the death penalty.  I have yet to see a 
death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-
execution stay applications in which the defendant was well 
represented at trial.”142 
138 See Reasonable Doubt:  Is the US Executing Innocent People?  A report by Equal Justice USA, 
available at http://www.quixote.org/ej/grip/reasonabledoubt/index.html (detailing 15 cases of executed 
people with strong claims of innocence).  
139 Dieter, supra note 131, at 14.   
140 Sister Helen Prejean, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS, 3-144 (Random House 2004).   
141 Maurice Possley and Steve Mills, Did This Man Die. . . for This Man’s Crime?, The Chicago Tribune, 
June 24, 2006, available at:  http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/broadband/chi-tx-
htmlstory,0,7935000.htmlstory.
142 Dieter, supra note 131, at 3.   
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In a similar vein, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor told a meeting of the Minnesota 
Women Lawyers, “Perhaps it’s time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel 
in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.”143 
The problem of innocence has become so acute that two federal judges have 
written about their concern that innocent people may be executed.  In striking down the 
federal death penalty as unconstitutional, U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff wrote in a 
2002 opinion:   
The Court found that the best available evidence indicates that, on the 
one hand, innocent people are sentenced to death with materially 
greater frequency than was previously supposed and that, on the other 
hand, convincing proof of their innocence often does not emerge until 
long after their convictions.  It is therefore fully foreseeable that in 
enforcing the death penalty, a meaningfully number of innocent people 
will be executed who otherwise would eventually be able to prove 
their innocence.144 
U.S. District Court Judge Michael Ponsor, who presided over the federal capital trial of 
Kristen Gilbert wrote: 
The experience [of sitting on a capital case] left me with one 
unavoidable  conclusion:  that a legal regime relying on the death 
penalty will inevitably execute innocent people – not too often, one 
hopes, but undoubtedly sometimes.  Mistakes will be made because it 
is simply not possible to do something this difficult perfectly, all the 
time.  Any honest proponent of capital punishment must face this 
fact.145 
143 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks at the Meeting of the Minnesota Women Lawyers, July 2, 2001. 
144 Dieter, supra note 131, at 33 citing United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), 
rev’d by 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).   
145 Dieter, supra note, at 34.   
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Convicting and executing the wrong person are not consistent with retributive justice.146 
There is no rationale for killing a person who has not committed a crime.  It is not just.  It 
is not necessary for incapacitation and it is not a deterrent.   
 Besides the cost of executing innocent people, there are other costs at stake in 
accepting a system that permits execution of the innocent.  Rampant examples of 
injustice weaken peoples’ faith in the criminal justice system and breakdown the fabric of 
social order, a cost that will affect all of us.   
 Any system of criminal justice will inevitably punish the innocent and punish the 
guilty more than they deserve.147 The question is:  what degree of error is 
constitutionally acceptable?   The current level of error should not survive a substantive 
due process challenge, because the compelling governmental interests do not outweigh 
the significant problems. 148 
B.  Death for the Most Vulnerable, not the most deserving149 
Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the death penalty is to be reserved for the 
worst of the worst offenders; the reality is that the death penalty is reserved for those who 
have the worst lawyer and who are least able to defend themselves. 150 The common 
 
146 “[T]he concern for accuracy in distribution of punishment is fundamentally a retributivist concern that 
renders the death penalty deeply problematic as an institutional practice[.]”  Markel, supra note 101, at 463.   
147 Laufer, supra note 120, at 355.   
148 As scholar Ursula Bentele concludes:  “When a capital punishment system results, despite full 
deliberation, in erroneous decisions depriving a person of life, substantive due process demands a showing 
of compelling government interests if the system is to be maintained.”  Bentele, supra note 6, at 1378.   
149 Race plays a large role in determining who is sentenced to death and could be a large part of this section.   
Because it is such a large part of capital sentencing, I am discussing that separately in section C.  I have 
included a separate section, B, discussing unjust sentencing practices because racial bias is not the only 
factor leading to unjust sentencing results.    
150 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:  The Death Penalty Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for 
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994).   
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saying, “Capital Punishment means them without the capital get the punishment,” is 
unfortunately true.  
 The death penalty has, in some sense, become largely a symbolic punishment.  
Less than 1% of murders result in a death sentence, but there is no indication that of the 
small number of people who are actually sentenced to death or executed that they were 
the most serious offenders.  Professor David McCord examined all death penalty cases in 
2004 looking at as many facts as he possibly could about each death-eligible case. 151 He 
identified a total of 469 defendants who met the “worst of the worst” standard.  He found 
that only 30 percent of those 469 had been sentenced to death, meaning that the vast 
majority received a sentence other than death.  Many of the 341 murderers who were 
spared the death penalty had more serious cases than those who received it.  Of the 2 
most aggravated cases that year -- Oklahoma City bomber Terry Nichols and serial killer 
Charles Cullen -- neither man received the death penalty.  Of the 11 serial killers, only 5 
were sentenced to death.152 
Furthermore, the system fails to capture and prosecute all offenders.  Many 
homicides go unprosecuted.  The more the system fails to prosecute, the more the burden 
of the death penalty falls on a select group of people.153 
While being poor and receiving incompetent counsel do not always go together, 
they often do.  Death rows are filled with mentally ill,154 mentally retarded,155 and poor156 
151 David McCord, If Capital Punishment were Subject to Consumer Protection Laws, 89 JUDICATURE 304, 
305 (2006). Professor McCord turned this piece into a full-length law review article published as Lightning 
Still Strikes:  Evidence from the Popular Press that Death Sentencing Continues to be Unconstitutionally 
Arbitrary More Than Three Decades After Furman, 71 Brooklyn Law Review 797 (2006).   
152 Professor Baldus hypothesizes that the failure of federal and state courts to conduct meaningful 
proportionality review has resulted in haphazard imposition of the death penalty for mid-range cases.  He 
suggests that in the most aggravated cases, the death penalty is imposed regardless of the race of the victim, 
but in the middle range cases it is imposed more haphazardly and less frequently.  Donnelly, supra note 
125, at 83.   
153 Marvin E. Wolfgang, We Do Not Deserve to Kill, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 977, 987 (1996).   
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people.  A truly retributive justice philosophy requires just deserts for those who are most 
blameworthy, not those who are most vulnerable.    
 The Court in Gregg required that death penalty sentencing schemes must afford 
discretion to the sentencing authority.  In any discretionary system, there are bound to be 
unequal results.  The standard is that the “discretion must be suitably directed and limited 
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” 157 The problem is 
that 30 years after Gregg, we have failed to develop a system where the discretion does 
not produce “wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”  According to some experts, the 
death-eligible class today is about as large as it was before Furman, and capital 
sentencing schemes are as inconsistent as they were pre-Furman.158 
Under a system of true retributive justice, all persons facing capital charges would 
begin on an equal playing field and have access to competent counsel.  This change alone 
would go a long way in leveling the playing field, thus minimizing arbitrary and 
capricious results.    
154 Cruel and Inhumane:  Executing the Mentally Ill, Amnesty International Magazine, available at:  
http://www.amnestyusa.org/magazine/cruel_and_inhumane_executing_the_mentally_ill.html (documenting 
the prevalence of mentally ill and mentally retarded people on death row); American Civil Liberties Union, 
Mental Illness and the Death Penalty in the United States, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/capital/mentalillness/10617pub20050131.html?ht=death%20row% 
20mental%20illness%20death%20row%20mental%20illness (January 31, 2005) (estimating that 5-10% of 
inmates on death row are mentally ill).   
155 Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath:  Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders and Excluding 
Them From Execution, 30 J. Legis. 77, 86 (2003); Elaine Cassel, Executing the Mentally Ill and the 
Mentally Retarded:  Three Key Recent Cases from Texas and Virginia Show How States Can Evade the 
Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Rulings, January 22, 2006, at FindLaw Legal News and Commentary 
available at:  http://writ.news.findlaw.com/cassel/20060622.html.
156 Colleen Bowers, The Death Penalty Doesn’t Deliver, July 12, 2006, Jackson Free Press (discussing 
generally discrimination against poor people in the implementation of the death penalty); Lanier and Acker 
at 581 (discussing documented socio-economic bias in the manner in which the death penalty is 
implemented in Nebraska); Bright, supra note 150. 
157 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.   
158 Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain From Heaven”:  Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. 
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Retributive justice requires an examination of the system that actually administers 
the penalty.  When that system results in “substantial number of cases in which 
defendants are erroneously convicted . . . or erroneously sentenced to death, the social 
goal of expressing community condemnation of “the worst of the worst” is no longer 
served.159 
C.  Racism and Geographical Disparity Play a Role in Death Sentencing 
 
The Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in 1972 on the grounds that the 
way it was administered violated the Eighth Amendment.  One of the Court’s concerns 
was the role that race played in death sentencing.160 Four years later, the Court upheld 
newly revised statutes that were supposed to ensure fairness.  Many believe that the past 
thirty years have not shown a significant increase in fairness.  Racial discrimination 
persists in the use of the death penalty from the charging decisions made by 
prosecutors161 through jury selection162jury deliberations and sentencing.  In many 
jurisdictions, African-Americans are tried in courtrooms where the judge, prosecutor, 
defense attorneys, bailiffs, police and jury are all white.163 One study revealed that only 
 
159 Bentele, supra note 6, at 1385.   
160 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1872).   
161 Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey:  The Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 327 (1988)(reporting significant discrepancies in the 
treatment of potentially capital cases by county); Developments in the Law:  Race and the Criminal 
Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1520-57 (1988)(discussing race and prosecutor’s charging decisions); 
Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in Post-Furman 
Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 743, 775 (1990-91)(prosecutorial decisions based 
on legal factors and on the race of the victim).   
162 See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, (2003); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. ___ (2005).   
163 See generally Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial:  The Tolerance of Racial 
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995). 
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1% of the District Attorneys in death penalty states are black and only 1% are Hispanic.  
The remaining 97.5 % are white, and almost all of them are male.164 
Noted death penalty attorney Professor Steven Bright argues that the manner in 
which the death penalty is practiced in the United States is a direct result of our country’s 
history of slavery, lynching and racial violence.165 Lynchings were common until 1920 
when Congress threatened to pass an anti-lynching law.  Lynchings were then replaced 
by trials, which were often little more than a quick submission to a mob demand.  Serena 
Hargrove noted: 
Lynchings were increasingly replaced by situations in which the 
Southern legal system prostituted itself to the mob’s demand.  
Responsible officials begged would-be lynchers to ‘let the law take its 
course,’ thus tacitly promising that there  would be a quick trial and 
the death penalty. . .Such proceedings retained the essence of mob 
murder, shedding only its outward form.166 
Indeed, Charles Black suggests that it simply may not be possible to administer 
capital punishment fairly because of our society’s history and the lingering effects of 
racial discrimination.167 
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court abdicated addressing the problem of 
racial discrimination in the infamous Georgia case of McCleskey v. Kemp.168 There, the 
Court was presented with research conducted by Professor David Baldus that found that 
in Georgia defendants were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty solely 
 
164 Jeffrey Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective:  Race and Gender of the Discretionary 
Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1817-1819 (1998). 
165 See generally Bright, supra note 163. 
166 Serena Hargrove, Capital Punishment:  21st Century Lynching, 6 U.D.C. L.REV. 33 (2001).   
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because the victim was white rather than black.169 In a narrow 5-4 decision, the Court 
refused to rely on this statistical evidence as proof of discrimination and ruled that 
Warren McCleskey would have to produce evidence of intentional discrimination, a 
nearly impossible burden to meet, before he would be entitled to challenge his death 
sentence on the basis of race.  The Court’s decision erected a wall protecting death 
penalty systems from race-based challenges.     
 Interestingly, even Justice Anton Scalia, who voted with the majority in 
McCleskey, believed that racial discrimination did exist.  He wrote in a confidential 
memo about the McCleskey decision, revealed when Justice Marshall’s papers were made 
public, “Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and 
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is 
real, acknowledged in the decisions of this Court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say 
that all I need is more proof.”170 As with the risk of executing innocent people, Justice 
Scalia is willing to live with a death penalty system that risks killing based on race. 
 Other studies, including one by Professors Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro, 
found that race played a role in seven other jurisdictions besides Georgia.  Examining all 
homicides reported by the FBI from Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia, the researches identified a “remarkably stable 
and consistent patter of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty in all 
eight states.”171 
169 Scott Howe, The Futile Quest for a Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth Amendment 
Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083, 
2109 (2004).   
170 Id. at 2122.   
171 See generally Samuel R. Cross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities 
in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984). 
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A 1990 report of the General Accounting Office (GAO) analyzed all of the then-
existing post-Furman studies and concluded that race influenced the charging and 
sentencing decisions in death penalty cases.172 
More recent studies also reported racial bias.  A study in New Jersey of 703 
formally- charged homicide cases found that the odds of a homicide involving a white 
victim would go to trail were nearly three times greater than with Hispanic victims and 
five times greater than with black victims.173 In some Southern states, African-
Americans are the victims in over 60% of the murders, but 85% of the death cases are 
cases with white victims.174 
Professor Baldus has published more recent studies from Georgia that reached the 
same conclusions as his original study, as well as a study in Philadelphia on all death-
eligible defendants prosecuted from 1983 to 1993, which found race-of-the-defendant 
bias.175 However, the Philadelphia study differed from Georgia in that the primary 
source of the racial disparities in Philadelphia was from the jury, rather than from the 
prosecutor.176 A study of 502 homicides that occurred between 1993 and 1997 concluded 
that defendants whose victims were white were 3.5 times more likely to be sentenced to 
death than defendants whose victims were nonwhites.177 A later study by the Committee 
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on Racial and Gender Bias in the Justice System published by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court called for a moratorium on the death penalty due to identified bias.178 
A study of all Maryland cases between 1978 and 1999 found “pronounced bias 
against killers of white victims and within the white-victim cases, additional bias against 
black offenders.”179 The New York Capital Defender Office reported widely divergent 
capital-charging practice – 20% of the state’s murders occurred outside New York City, 
but 65% of death penalty notices were filed outside the city.180 
Preliminary studies of the federal death penalty showed “disproportionate 
numbers of minority offenders facing federal death penalty charges as well as marked 
geographical disparities in the capital prosecutions initiated in the several federal districts 
throughout the country.”181 Three quarters of those convicted under 21 U.S.C. section 
848, the federal drug kingpin law that provides for the death penalty, are white, but 33 
out of 37 of the first 37 prosecutions brought under the death penalty provisions of the 
statute were against members of minority groups.182 
Some scholars speculate that African-Americans benefit from these 
discriminatory patterns.  They argue that since most homicides are interracial, it follows 
that most black victims are being killed by black defendants.  The fact that death penalty 
jurisdictions consistently devalue the lives of black victims (by seeking the death penalty 
against killers of white victims but not black victims) means that the black defendants 
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who are most likely to be killing the black victims are spared being sentenced to death.183 
While there may be some truth to this argument, it fails to explain why it is that such a 
high percentage of black people convicted of killing white victims are sentenced to death 
given that the majority of people who kill whites are white.    
 Some jurisdictions where race has not been identified as a problem have found 
that geography plays a role in death sentencing.  A study done at the request of the 
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice concluded that there 
was no significant evidence of racial bias in the treatment of offenders, but found that 
there were wide geographic disparities in charging and plea bargaining practices and a 
significant effect of victims’ socioeconomic status on charging and sentencing 
outcomes.184 
The Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) of the Virginia 
Legislative Assembly also found that geography figured more significantly than race in 
prosecutors’ charging decisions.  “Prosecutors in urban centers were less likely to seek 
death against capital-eligible defendants than those in rural areas, notwithstanding 
factually similar crimes.”185 
Studies show in the abstract the perniciousness of capital punishment, but what is 
even more shocking is how racism plays itself out in the courts.  For example, William 
Dobbs, who was an African-American man in Georgia convicted of the murder of a white 
man, was referred to as “colored” and “colored boy” by the judge and defense attorney 
and the prosecutor called him by his first name.  Two of the jurors admitted to having 
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called Dobbs a “nigger.”186 Dobbs’ own defense attorney seemed to be his own worst 
enemy.  The lawyer made his opinion about blacks known throughout the trial.  The 
federal district court reviewing the case characterized the attorney’s views in this way: 
Dobbs’ trial attorney was outspoken about his views.  He said that 
many blacks are uneducated and would not make good teachers, but do 
make good basketball players. He opined that blacks are less educated 
and less intelligent than whites either because of their nature or 
because “my granddaddy had slaves.”  He said that integration has led 
to deteriorating neighborhoods and schools and referred to the black 
community in Chattanooga as “black boy jungle.”  He strongly 
implied that blacks have inferior morals by relating a story about sex 
in a classroom.  He also said that when he was young, a maid was 
hired with the understanding that she would steal some items.187 
Dobbs is not alone.  Bright identified five other Georgia capital cases where the 
defendants’ own attorneys had used racial slurs.  He also documented a case where the 
judge called the parents of an African-American defendant “nigger mom and dad.”  He 
noted that around this same time, CBS fired a commentator who made a racial slur, but 
the judge experienced no repercussions whatsoever188 suggesting that racism in sports 
announcing will not be tolerated, but racism in capital trials will be. 
 Despite the fact that it is unconstitutional for prosecutors to strike potential jurors 
from serving on a jury because of their race, the practice is common.  A notorious 
training video made by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office instructed new 
prosecutors, in violation of the constitution, not to select young black women or blacks 
from low income areas for jury duty because, “young black women are very bad to have 
on the jury and blacks from low-income areas are less likely to convict.”  The video 
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instructed prosecutors how to hide racial motives in their jury strikes.189 Similarly, 
District Attorney Ed Peters of Mississippi publicly announced his policy to “get rid of as 
many black citizens as possible when exercising his peremptory challenges.”190 Neither 
District Attorney experienced any repercussions for their illegal conduct.   
 The legacy of discrimination identified in Furman has not been corrected in the 
thirty years since Gregg.  Entrenched racial bias in the application of the death penalty 
undermines the principles of retributive justice.  As scholar Scott Howe wrote, “If the 
State relies on aggravating evidence that does not relate directly to the defendant’s 
personal culpability, the death sentence is unjust compared to the punishment imposed in 
murder cases involving defendants of equal desert [culpability] who do not receive the 
death penalty.”191 
If the State is using race or geography as a factor in seeking or obtaining death 
sentences, it is not comporting with the requirement of ordinal proportionality, and is, 
therefore, not abiding by principles of retributive justice.  As Bassett concludes: 
Death sentences imposed in the face of a strong and empirically 
verified risk of racial bias in capital cases are morally inconsistent with 
retributivism, independently of whether racial discrimination actually 
entered into any given capital sentencing decision.  This is because 
retributivism forbids exposing defendants to an excessive risk of 
improper punishment and racial bias creates such a risk in today’s 
capital sentencing regime.  Because the McCleskey Court sanctions 
systemic racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty, 
the McCleskey decision is morally inconsistent with retributivism.192 
2.  The Death Penalty is Not an Effective Deterrent to Homicide 
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Whether the death penalty actually deters homicides is a subject that has been 
debated widely.  Prominent criminologist Ernest van den Haag stated that “Common 
sense, lately bolstered by statistics, tells us that the death penalty will deter murder, if 
anything can.  People fear nothing more than death.”193 Another scholar suggests that a 
“common-sense” conclusion is that the fact that “the death penalty either deters or does 
not deter are both speculative.”194 Interestingly, 67% of law-enforcement officials “do not 
believe capital punishment reduces the homicide rate.”195 Justice Breyer recently 
analyzed a number of deterrence studies in the case of Ring v. Arizona and concluded that 
“[s]tudies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive.”196 It seems fair to conclude, that 
there is no clear evidence that abolishing the death penalty has led to an increase in 
homicides, or conversely, that reinstituting it has led to a decrease.197 
Many scholars are emphatic in their assertion that the death penalty is not a 
deterrent, and if anything, may actually increase homicides.  Scholars Charles Lanier and 
James Acker claim that the overwhelming body of research shows “no credible evidence 
that capital punishment is a superior deterrent to murder than is life imprisonment.” 198 
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They cite to thirteen studies to support this assertion as well as a study by scholars 
Peterson and Bailey who reviewed the mass of studies on the death penalty and 
deterrence.199  Renowned scholar David Baldus claims a nearly complete consensus on 
the agreement that the death penalty does not deter crime more effectively than life 
imprisonment.  “If there is any marginal deterrent effect from the death penalty, it is 
beyond our capacity to measure and document.”200 Any studies purporting to show a 
deterrent effect have been thoroughly discredited in the research community for their 
“faculty methodologies and failure to stand up under attempted replication.”201 
One long-time supporter of deterrence theory is Joanna Shepard, a criminologist 
at Duke University.  Shepard has spent much of her career researching deterrence 
theories using econometric models.  She had previously published articles claiming that 
for every execution on average three murders were deterred.202 Shepherd has since 
revised her findings after she conducted a state-by-state analysis of the homicide figures.  
Her newest conclusion is that jurisdictions are too varied to draw uniform conclusions.  
She recalculated the deterrence rate on a state-by-state basis and found that while in some 
jurisdictions the death penalty does have a deterrent effect, in others there is no deterrent 
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effect, and in some the death penalty has a brutalizing effect, increasing the number of 
homicides.203 Other scholars have also concluded that capital punishment actually 
increases homicides.204 However, some researchers have concluded that capital 
punishment may deter other crimes such as robbery, burglary, and assault, when 
executions receive a certain amount of television coverage.205 
Another indicator that the death penalty is not a deterrent to murder is the fact that 
states without the death penalty have consistently had lower homicide rates than states 
with it.  Selllin first established this in 1967 and 1980 and these numbers were replicated 
in 1988.206 
In 2000 The New York Times reported:  
 
[There are] no crime trends supporting a deterrent effect of capital 
punishment.  Indeed, 10 out of 12 states without capital punishment 
have homicide rates below  the national average…while half the states 
with the death penalty have homicide rates above the national 
average…[D]uring the last 20 years, the homicide rate in  states with 
the death penalty has been 48 percent to 101 percent higher than in 
states without the death penalty.207 
In conclusion, there is simply not enough evidence that capital punishment deters crime 
to withstand a strict scrutiny challenge.  The overwhelming majority of researchers 
believe that it does not.  Some believe that it actually increases the homicide rate.  As 
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Justice Breyer concluded, at best, the studies are inconclusive.  At worst, the death 
penalty may accomplish the opposite of what it intends to do.   
 The public appears to be losing confidence in the death penalty as a form of 
deterrence since a high in 1983 dropping from 63% in 1983 to 44% in 2000.208 A 2004 
study reported even less public belief in deterrence -- only 35%.”209 However, a 1986 
poll showed that 73% of those in favor of the death penalty would still be in favor of it 
even if it were proved that there was no deterrent effect.210 Still, public perception as to 
whether the death penalty is a deterrent is vitally important, because public perception is 
probably a reflection of individual beliefs, and is, therefore, an indication of whether 
people are deterred by the threat of a death sentence.    
3.  The Manner in Which the Death Penalty is Practiced and its Consequences 
Lessons its Ability to Vindicate Legal and Moral Order  
 
Superficially, the death penalty appears to be a compelling way for the state to 
denounce serious crime and vindicate legal and moral order.  Professor Sigler points out 
that Justice Stewart in his Gregg opinion, stressed the importance of the denunciatory 
rationale as being “essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal 
processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.”211 Further, Stewart quotes 
Lord Justice Denning:  “[I]n order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the 
punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the 
great majority of citizens for them.”212 
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However, a deeper examination of the reality of the death penalty reveals a 
crumbling infrastructure upon which no solid house can be built.  The serious problems 
in the administration of the death penalty undermine its ability to serve as an effective 
means of denouncing or vindicating crime, or of restoring moral order.      
 
A.  There are Serious Problems with the Administration of the Death Penalty 
 
When Illinois Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on executions in 
2000, the tenor of the death penalty debate in this country changed.213 The impetus for 
Governor Ryan’s unusual move was the revelation of serious problems such as the 
exoneration of 13 death row inmates in a state where only 12 had been executed during 
the modern era.  Governor Ryan was not an abolitionist, but he did not want to preside 
over the execution of an innocent person.  He appointed a highly qualified, bi-partisan 
commission to study the Illinois system, and come up with recommendations to ensure 
that no innocent person would be executed.   
 After two years of serious study, the Commission produced 85 recommendations, 
some of which were adopted by the Illinois legislature. 214 Significantly, the Commission 
also concluded that the only way to ensure that innocent people would not be executed 
was to eliminate the death penalty.215 Before leaving office, Ryan commuted the death 
 
213 A copy of the press release announcing the Governor’s decision is available at the State of Illinois Home 
page at:  http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=359.
214 Lanier, supra note 136, at 579. Among the recommended changes included: 
Changes in police practices to help safeguard the reliability of evidence produced during pretrial 
investigations; the introduction of guidelines and centralized review to help regulate prosecutors’ capital-
charging decisions; significant restrictions in the range of death penalty eligible murders; periodic training 
for judges and attorneys in capital cases; and the commitment of substantial additional resources.  The 
Commission also recommended that better data on capital cases be collected.  It is noteworthy that no state 
in the country comes close to meeting the standards recommended by the Commission.   
215 Illinois Commission Highlights Death Penalty’s Inherent Flaws, Human Rights Watch, April 17, 2001, 
available at:  http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/04/17/usdom3860.htm.
54
sentences of all but seven people216on death row to life in prison,217 after determining that 
the manner in which the death sentences had been obtained could not guarantee their 
accuracy or fairness.    
The same year as Ryan’s dramatic pronouncement, Professor James Liebman and 
scholars at Columbia University Law School released a comprehensive study of every 
death penalty appeal from 1973 to 1995.218 The review of literally thousands of cases 
revealed that 68% of all death penalty cases were reversed due to serious errors at trial, 
resulting in new trials or new sentencing hearings.  Upon retrial, 82% of the cases 
resulted in a sentence less than death, and in 7% of those cases, the defendants were 
found to be innocent.219 The three most common reasons for these errors were 
incompetent defense attorneys, prosecutorial misconduct and faulty jury instructions.220 
Other factors that have contributed to the high incidence of wrongful convictions 
include police misconduct, racial prejudice, unreliable jail house witnesses and faulty 
forensic science.221 For example, serious problems in the operation of forensic 
laboratories have been discovered in several locations including Oklahoma, Virginia and 
Texas.  The most shocking examples of laboratory dereliction came out of Harris County, 
Texas, where the laboratory had been providing false DNA evidence for the last twenty-
five years.222 The significance of these lab failures can be best understood by considering 
that 35% of all executions in the United States during the modern era came out of Texas, 
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the overwhelming majority out of Harris County.223 The laboratory was shut down and 
the federal government took the highly unusual step of striking all of the results from 
CODIS, the national DNA database.224 
Official misconduct is more likely to occur when a defendant is represented by an 
incompetent, or inexperienced, lawyer, because prosecutors and police take advantage of 
their incompetence or inexperience.  An example of this is the case of Glenn Ford from 
Louisiana whose court-appointed trial attorney was an oil and gas law specialist who had 
never tried a criminal case and had never appeared before a jury.  Taking advantage of 
the lawyer’s inexperience, the prosecutor withheld a series of police reports suggesting 
that Mr. Ford’s co-defendants had actually shot and killed the victim and hid the murder 
weapon.  These reports were not discovered until Mr. Ford had competent post-
conviction representation.  Mr. Ford, who was black, was tried by an all white jury to 
which his trial lawyer did not object.225 
Other stories of incompetent defense counsel abound as Charles Lanier and James 
Acker note:  
There is no shortage of stories involving scandalous representation 
provided to indigent defendants on trial for their lives – stories 
involving sleeping lawyers (Burdine v. Johnson, 2001), intoxicated 
layers (People v. Garrison, 1989), lawyers wholly unfamiliar with 
death penalty law and procedures (Frey v.  Fulcomer, 1992), lawyers 
making racist remarks about their clients (Ex parte Guzmon, 1987; 
Goodwin v. Balkom, 1982), lawyers who ended up disbarred and even 
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incarcerated shortly after representing their clients (Young v. Kemp, 
1985; Young v. Zant, 1984), and lawyers lacking the experience and 
resources to  mount any semblance of an effective defense.226 
Many death row families were seriously disillusioned with the justice system because of 
the incompetence of their loved ones’ attorney.  Tragically, many families used life 
savings to hire incompetent attorneys only to later learn their family member would have 
been better defended by a public defender.  Some of their family members were 
represented by attorneys with drinking problems; some of the attorneys had had problems 
with ethical violations; and some were disbarred after representing their family member.  
Many had no experience whatsoever in trying capital cases.227 
These experiences are backed up by state studies.  A Chicago Tribune 
investigation of the death penalty in Illinois found that “at least 33 death row inmates had 
been represented at trial by an attorney who has since been disbarred or suspended.228 A
similar investigation by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer found that “one-fifth of the 84 
people who have faced execution in the past 20 years were represented by lawyers who 
had been, or were later, disbarred, suspended or arrested.”229 
Not surprisingly, many family members lost faith in the criminal justice system 
from what they perceived to be an unfair process that their loved one endured.  One 
father, who was retired military who had previously had complete faith in the justice 
system, lost that faith after his son’s trial.  One of the witnesses testified that his son “was 
near the scene of the crime in his Volkswagen – that they had to push it.  And we knew it 
wasn’t true because [the victim] was killed in December of 1982 and the car wasn’t 
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bought until September of 1983.”  Further salt was rubbed into this wound when the 
prosecutor suggested that the family falsified the records.  Police chemist Joyce Gilchrist 
testified that the hair found proved that “[this man’s son] was in close and violent contact 
with the victim.”  Later Gilchrist was discredited and fired after revelations that for many 
years, in dozens of cases, she had falsified evidence.  The jury never learned that absolute 
identification from hair examination is not possible.230 
The problems in the administration of the death penalty have reached such epic 
proportions that 2,000 organizations and governmental bodies have called for moratoria – 
a temporary suspension in the use of executions – until concerns of fairness can be 
addressed.231 
A system of justice as flawed as this teaches its citizens that criminal justice does 
not coincide with actual justice.  It teaches contempt for the law and may impair 
obedience to the law.232 It lacks the moral authority to vindicate legal and moral order.233 
B.  The Death Penalty Victimizes Other People Involved in its Implementation 
 
The death penalty harms other people besides the death row families.  Although 
there is very little research on secondary victimization, there is evidence that juries, 
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judges,234 prosecutors, defense attorneys, prison personnel,235 and witnesses to an 
execution may experience prolonged trauma.236 
In a recent Tennessee Bar Journal article, Senior Judge Gilbert Merritt of the U.S. 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “state and federal judges agree that the judicial 
administration of the death penalty is by far the most difficult, time-consuming, 
frustrating and critical joint problem that the Tennessee state and federal judiciary have to 
grapple with on a daily basis.”237 
This perspective is, of course, not shared with all players in the system.  Harris 
Country Prosecutor Bill Hawkins recently wrote an article documenting how the death 
penalty did not take much of a toll on the Texas criminal justice system, and concluded:  
“The truth is that whatever the cost, be it financial, a citizen’s time, or the time and stress 
on the trial participants, the impact of the death penalty on the criminal justice system is 
worth the price.238 
There is a growing body of research establishing that jurors who serve on capital 
trials suffer a variety of psychological and physical symptoms.  The Capital Jury Project, 
a national research program sponsored by the National Science Foundation, has 
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conducted in-depth interviews with capital jurors in 14 states.  Researchers have 
identified  
one or more physical and/or psychological symptoms that could be 
related to jury duty.  These included reoccurring thoughts about the 
trial that would keep the jurors awake at night or nightmares about the 
crime and the defendant, stomach  pains, nervousness, tension, 
shaking, headaches, heart palpitations, sexual inhibitions, depression, 
anorexia, faintness, numbness, chest pain, and hives.  . . .  Findings 
showed that jurors whose jury panel rendered a death penalty did 
sustain greater PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] symptoms than 
did jurors whose jury panel rendered a life sentence.239 
Steve Presson, a capital attorney in Oklahoma, has represented many capital defendants 
and has, over the years, become close to many.  One client, Scott Hain, who was a 
juvenile at the time of the crime, was devastated when he learned that his parents would 
not witness his death and did not want his remains or his property.  He asked Steve to 
take his ashes to Hawaii and scatter them there and told Steve that “[he] had been more of 
a father figure to him than anyone else in his life.”240 Nine of Presson’s clients have been 
executed, which has caused him tremendous pain.  Other capital attorneys have 
experienced similar stress. 
 Others harmed by the death penalty process are the family members of the murder 
victims.  Many victims’ family members oppose capital punishment and believe that it 
harms them.241 Even those family members who support capital punishment are often 
harmed by the process.  The long and complicated appeals process, necessary to ensure 
accuracy and fairness, is often characterized by repeated court hearings, including new 
 
239 Michael Antonio, Jurors’ Emotional Reactions to Serving on a Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 282, 283 
(2006) (While a large majority of jurors reflected negatively upon their experience serving on a capital 
case, some enjoyed it.  Some jurors reported the experience as “quite exciting and really enjoyed it,” “a 
learning experience,” and “very rewarding, educational.”) 
240 Sharp, supra note 39, at 154.   
241 See generally, Rachel King, DON’T KILL IN OUR NAMES: FAMILIES OF MURDER VICTIMS SPEAK OUT 
AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, Rutgers University Press (2003). 
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trials or sentencing hearings.  Victims are retraumatized by these hearings and the media 
attention that they attract.   
 For victims that oppose capital punishment, they are sometimes treated so poorly 
that they lose the status of “victim.” This happened to Audrey Lamm and her father Guss 
Lamm of Oregon who requested permission to speak before the parole board seeking 
clemency for the killer of their mother and wife.  This request was denied on the ground 
that they were not “victims” under the victims’ rights laws of Oregon.242 Felicia Floyd 
and Chris Kellett opposed the execution of their father, who had murdered their mother 
and grandmother.  While they were given the opportunity to testify against the execution 
before the parole board, the board discounted their remarks considering them to be 
“supporters of the defendant” and not “victims” of the homicide.243 
Another particularly extreme example of mistreatment towards a victim was that 
of SueZanne Bosler whose father, a Mennonite minister, was murdered in the parsonage 
where the family lived.  Ms. Bosler was attacked and left for dead.  She did not want the 
killer, James Bernard Campbell, a young black man who was border-line mentally 
retarded, to be sentenced to death; she supported a life sentence without the possibility of 
parole.  She begged the prosecutor to resolve the case with a plea agreement to a life 
sentence, but he would not.  Instead, she had to endure being a witness at trial and in 
three subsequent sentencing trials.  (Campbell’s sentence was twice overturned by 
appeals courts because of prosecutorial misconduct.)   
 After a decade of litigation, Ms. Bosler was tired of being used by the state in its 
efforts to kill Campbell while she was denied the opportunity to tell the jury that she 
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opposed it.  She hired an attorney who advised her of a way that she could legally express 
her opposition to the death penalty to the jury.  When she was testifying, the prosecutor 
asked her what she did for work as a way to get the jury to know her and she replied that 
she was a hairdresser and she traveled around the country working to end the death 
penalty.  The prosecutor and judge were furious with her, and the judge threatened to 
throw her in jail for contempt of court if she mentioned opposition to the death penalty 
again. On the third sentencing hearing, ten years after the crime occurred, the jury 
sentenced Campbell to life.244 Besides the stress and strain of ten years of litigation, the 
state also spent untold resources on its unsuccessful attempt to kill Campbell.    
 Another aspect of the death penalty that is stressful for families is that it often 
causes a rift between family members who support it and those who oppose it.  This is a 
common occurrence, and sometimes family members are pitted against each other.  This 
happened with Maria Hines who opposed the execution of her brother’s killer, whereas 
her sister-in-law supported it.  Before the execution, the media turned their disagreement 
into a major issue, pitting them against each other until there were so many bad feelings 
that it created a rift which has still not healed nearly 20 years later.245 Ms. Hines, who had 
befriended the killer, felt tremendous sadness and grief after his execution, and deep 
sadness because of the estrangement with her extended family.246 
Like Ms. Hines, Sue Norton befriended Robert Knighton (known as BK) who 
killed her father and stepmother and spoke publicly against his execution.  Her sister 
supported the execution.  Their disagreement became the focus of many media stories.  
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After all his appeals failed, Mrs. Norton witnessed BK’s execution, at his request.  The 
stress of BK’s execution made Mrs. Norton, a cheerful and optimistic person, stressed 
and tearful.  After the execution, she reported,  
“I am just trying to maintain. . . I bawled all the way home the other 
day and Gene [her husband] listened to me talk for two hours.  He has 
been so good.  I have not been out of the house since.  I was supposed 
to go to the store and do some errands this morning, but did not go.  I 
hate leaving the house alone.”247 
The stress was compounded by the fact that she and her sister disagreed with each other, 
which became a big part of the story of BK’s execution.248 
Johnnie Carter witnessed the execution of the man who killed her granddaughter.  
She did not condone his crime, but she opposed his execution.  At her request, she met 
the man in prison and he answered questions about the murder for her.  When he asked 
her to witness the execution, she agreed.  “It took my breath away,” she said of the 
experience.  After the execution, the family members who supported the execution were 
escorted to an area inside the prison for a press conference, but Ms. Carter was told to go 
outside into the cold rainy night.249 
By harming others involved in the process, especially the victims’ family 
members, the death penalty loses much of its moral authority.  Any benefit to society 
inured from the death penalty is outweighed by its negative impact -- creating rifts within 
families, re-traumatizing victims, and traumatizing jurors, judges and prison personnel.  
In the effort to restore moral order, the death penalty creates other moral problems.   
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C.  The High Cost of the Death Penalty Lessens its Ability to Serve as an Effective 
Denunciation or Vindication of Legal and Moral Order 
 
The cost of capital punishment may not be an appropriate area of discourse in 
discussions of morality.  If capital punishment were working as a deterrent and were 
applied fairly, the cost of carrying out the punishment should be of little concern.  
However, given that the death penalty is not serving the social goals, the fact that it also 
costs significantly more than other punishments should be a concern when considering 
whether it is an appropriate way to denounce violence and vindicate social order.   
 It is difficult to obtain precise figures, and the costs vary significantly between 
jurisdictions, but several studies have concluded that death penalty systems demand 
significantly more resources than jurisdictions where life imprisonment is the maximum 
punishment. 250 Some numbers that are particularly noteworthy are that each execution in 
North Carolina (when you consider the total costs involved) exceeds $2 million.  
California taxpayers could save $90 million a year by abolishing the death penalty.  
Several country budgets have been bankrupted by the cost of bringing capital cases.251 
Despite the millions spent (or misspent) on capital punishment, there is little 
return for the money.  As Lanier and Acker explain: 
Ironically, though, the considerable financial investments incurred in 
virtually all  capital prosecutions produce a modest return in the form 
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of executions.  Only about half of trials in which a death sentence is 
sought result in conviction for a capital crime and a sentence of death.  
Even in cases in which death sentences are imposed, later judicial 
review results in as many as two out of three capital convictions and/or 
sentences being vacated.  The great majority of offenders thus will end 
up serving lengthy prison sentences, even though huge sums of money 
were fruitlessly spent pursuing their execution.  These extra costs are 
not a factor in systems in which life imprisonment is the maximum 
punishment.252 
Based on calculations of the Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission, the 
average death penalty case from trial to execution (using 10 years in prison as a 
calculation – many prisoners are in much longer before execution) was $667,560, 
whereas the typical life-without-parole case from trial to death (using 47 years in prison 
for calculations) where a death penalty was never sought was $551,016.  This means that 
even including the costs of 47 years in prison (which is much longer than most prisoners 
survive in prison) was still $116,544 less expensive than a death case which included an 
estimating 47 years in prison.253 This figure does not include any expenses incurred 
when capital convictions are vacated in collateral proceedings, on appeal or upon federal 
review, and remanded for further proceedings, all of which are frequent occurrences.  
Between the period of 1986 and 2005, 35% of all Indiana death row defendants had their 
cases remanded to trial court for further proceedings.254 
4.   The Death Penalty is not necessary to Incapacitate Offenders 
 
There is no arguing with the fact that executing an offender incapacitates him or 
her.  However, with today’s modern penal system, it is not necessary to execute an 
offender to accomplish the goal of incapacitation.  Every state, and the federal 
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government, has high security prisons, which keep dangerous offenders from escaping or 
killing while incarcerated.   While escapes and prison murders do happen, they are rare. 
 The public has a legitimate interest in the concern that a convicted killer, if 
released, may kill again.  But the rate of recidivism among released murderers is 
extremely low,255 and in any event, most defendants who are not sentenced to death are 
sentenced to life without parole, which Justice Breyer has suggested is a sufficient 
punishment alternative to ensure an offender does not commit further crimes.256 
Furthermore, it is hard to argue that the death penalty is necessary to incapacitate 
murderers when the overwhelmingly majority of people who commit homicide are not 
sentenced to death.  Of the estimated 6,300 people sentenced to death since 1976, only 
1,012 of them have been executed.257 Researchers estimate that only 2.2% of offenders 
arrested for murder are sentenced to death.258 Of the 21,000 homicides a year, only 300 
are sentenced to death, and an even smaller number, well less than 100 most years, are 
actually put to death.  While not all of the 21,000 homicides would have been death 
eligible, many of them would have been.   
 Short of a mandatory death penalty, which the Supreme Court has declared 
unconstitutional, there will always be discrepancies and inconsistencies in death 
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sentencing. 259 However, the point is that the death penalty is so infrequently used that is 
has become more symbolic than normative.  It is difficult to argue that the death penalty 
is a necessary means of incapacitating murderers when so few of them are actually 
subjected to it. 
IV. Any Legitimate Criminal Justice Interests a State May Have in Using the Death 
Penalty are not sufficiently narrowly Tailored to Survive a Strict Scrutiny Analysis  
 
A substantive due process challenge requires balancing the states’ interests 
against the rights of the individual.  In this case, the harm caused to the families cannot 
be justified by the death penalty because it has failed so completely to live up to the goals 
for which it exists.  The manner in which the death penalty is practiced does not comport 
with its stated criminal justice goals such as deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and 
restoration of social order.  To the extent that it does accomplish these goals, “the 
infringement is [not] narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”260 Under 
Glucksberg, the government may not infringe on “fundamental’” liberty interests at all, 
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest.”261 Strict scrutiny further requires that state action limiting 
the exercise of a fundamental right must be the least restrictive means to serve that end.262 
259 The Supreme Court struck down a mandatory death penalty scheme in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976).  Professor Steven Gey believes that Justice Scalia has endorsed the 
constitutionality of mandatory death penalty schemes.  See Gey, supra note 94, at 92.  As much as I dislike 
agreeing with Scalia, the mandatory approach seems to be one way to address the problem of arbitrary and 
uneven sentencing.  However, what would likely happen is that, like in the case of mandatory drug 
sentencing, a mandatory death penalty would increase the importance of the prosecutor’s discretion in 
seeking a death sentence, and would still result in unfairness.   
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The death penalty for the sake of retribution falls short of meeting that goal 
because of the numerous problems with the way it is practiced that make it an essentially 
unfair punishment.  The problem of wrongful convictions and the possible execution of 
innocent people severely diminishes the death penalty as a form of retribution.  Inevitably 
innocent people will be executed.  The state’s legitimate interests in punishing murderers 
cannot be justified by killing innocent people, when other acceptable forms of 
punishment are available.  Indeed some scholars believe that the twin requirements of 
individualized sentencing and eliminating arbitrariness in sentencing cannot be 
reconciled.  263 Justice Blackmun ultimately came out against the death penalty because 
of his skepticism that the two goals could ever be reconciled, and his belief that if the two 
goals could be reconciled, the Supreme Court had failed to do so.  He wrote: 
[E]ven if the constitutional requirements of consistency and fairness 
are theoretically reconcilable in the context of capital punishment, it is 
clear that this Court is not prepared to meet the challenge.  In apparent 
frustration over its inability to strike an appropriate balance between 
the Furman promise of consistency and the Lockett requirement of 
individualized sentencing, the Court has retreated from the field.264 
As regards to the death penalty as a form of deterrence, too many studies indicate 
that the homicide rate “bears no relation to the existence or non-existence of capital 
punishment.265 The uncertainty surrounding the deterrence debate, suggests that it cannot 
pass a strict scrutiny challenge.  Additionally, the fact that some research indicates that 
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the death penalty may have a brutalizing effect, strengthens the argument that the death 
penalty as a deterrent cannot survive a strict scrutiny challenge.   
 The death penalty’s strongest policy argument is that it is an effective means of 
incapacitation.  However, a strict scrutiny analysis requires that the state use the most 
narrowly-tailored means to accomplish its goal.  Given the availability of modern penal 
systems, and lengthy prison terms such as life in prison without parole, the state’s 
justification for using the death penalty as a means to incapacitate prisoners is no longer 
valid.  266 Further, in the unlikely event that a person convicted of first-degree murder 
would ever be released from prison, a number of studies have established that convicted 
murderers have a lower recidivism rate than other criminals.267 
I would argue that the death penalty falls so short of the mark of accomplishing its 
stated goals that it does not even pass a rationale based scrutiny, let alone a strict scrutiny 
standard.268 However, even if some believe otherwise, that the death penalty does 
accomplish its stated goals, it still does not pass the second part of the strict scrutiny test, 
which requires that the penalty be narrowly drawn.  Alternatives to the death penalty are 
certainly available and can accomplish the states’ goals of deterring, punishing, 
incapacitating and restoring moral order, perhaps even better than capital punishment 
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does.269 Given the myriad of problems involved in capital punishment, we should not 
have a “perfect” punishment, where the penalty is irrevocable, when we have an 
“imperfect system.”270 
V. Who, What, When and How -- the practical aspects of the theory. 
 
There are a number of questions that are obviously raised by this substantive due 
process argument such as who can bring this challenge, how do they bring it, and could 
the theory be applied to other types of punishment.  I will address these questions 
generally.   
Who Can Bring the Claim? 
 
It is not my intention that this argument would be raised by the defendant at a 
sentencing hearing.  If there is one point I am trying to make, it is that family members of 
people on death row have constitutional rights protected by the Due Process Clause that 
are entirely separate from those of the defendant.  Some may argue that this challenge is 
unfair to the death row prisoner who has no family members.  This is true.  I can only 
reiterate what I already stated, that the right I am discussing is for the family member, not 
for the prisoner.     
 The Supreme Court has already ruled that the Due Process Clause protects certain 
family relationships including parent child (Meyers and Stanley), spouses (Griswold, 
Loving, and Michael H.), and grandparents and extended families (Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland).  Presumably anyone who is in the immediate family such as spouses, parents 
or children, or close extended family such as grandparents, cousins or aunts and uncles, 
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would have standing to bring a suit enjoining the prosecution of a capital case on the 
grounds that it interferes with their constitutionally-protected right to family. 
Challenging Other Types of Punishment 
 
The next obvious question is should a family member have standing to challenge 
any type of punishment, even a prison term.  The answer to that question is, it depends. 
On the one hand, death is different in kind from every other form of punishment.  As 
former Justice Brennan wrote in Furman, “In comparison to all other punishments 
today… the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to 
human dignity.”271 No other punishment completely severs the family relationship.   
 Because death is different, the state is under an obligation to show that the harm 
done to the family can be justified for other legitimate purposes.  Because the death 
penalty so completely fails to meet its policy goals, and it causes extreme harm to 
families, it cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis.  It is far easier to imagine eliminating 
the death penalty than it is to imagine eliminating prisons altogether.272 
A substantive due process attack on other forms of punishment would be more 
difficult to make because the degree of arbitrariness acceptable in death sentences should 
be less than in other forms of punishment.273 Further, one hopes that other forms of 
punishment are more narrowly drawn so that they are not so manifestly unfair as the 
death penalty.  Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case.  There are other forms of 
punishment that severely interfere with the family relationship, and that may not 
withstand a strict scrutiny challenge.  The example that springs to mind is a challenge to 
some of the excessive and draconian punishments for drug crimes, where the state does 
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not get any great benefit from sentencing drug offenders to lengthy terms, but there is a 
tremendous harm to the families. 
Can the State remedy the Harm Caused by Providing Services to the Families? 
 
The state could reduce the harm to the death row families by providing services 
such as therapy, counseling, and economic assistance.  Most states offer some type of 
service to homicide victims, and these statutes could be used to provide similar assistance 
to people whose family member was a victim of state-sponsored homicide.  This would 
have been helpful to the family of Abdullah Hameen, especially to his son, who had he 
had the benefit of counseling or vocational assistance, may not have ended up in prison.  
However, this type of assistance does not go far enough.  Just as no punishment will ever 
restore the victims’ family to wholeness, no amount of state assistance will restore the 
family members of the prisoner for the harm caused by the death penalty.   
Viability of the Claim 
 
Courts may be reluctant to entertain this type of claim because it is so novel.  
However, the argument is grounded in long-held constitutional principles and should be 
sufficient to give family members standing to bring suit.  If a court refuses to entertain 
the claim, it will likely be not because the claim lacks solid legal footing, but because 
there is political fear of the repercussions of attacking the death penalty in this manner.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In its’ per curium opinion striking down the death penalty in 1972, the connecting 
thread of the five separate opinions was the principle that punishment must be rational.  
The Court determined that the manner in which the penalty was applied was so arbitrary, 
discriminatory, and irrational, that it violated both the Eighth Amendment and the Due 
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Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.274 Assuming arguendo that 
states have legitimate penological interests in using the death penalty, those interests are 
not sufficient to withstand a strict scrutiny analysis.   
 Families of death row defendants suffer infringement of their constitutional right 
to family when the death penalty is used.  The harm occurs not just from the execution, 
but from the charging and prosecution of the case as well.  The right to family is a long-
established fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.  This right to family is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”275 Further, is has been carefully described 
through jurisprudence.   
 The death penalty does not serve the compelling interests for which it supposedly 
exists – to deter crime, to incapacitate offenders, to restore moral order, and to serve as a 
form of retribution.  Even if it serves those interests, it is not the least restrictive means 
available to do so.  A lengthy prison sentence, including life in prison, serves the same 
goals better and does not create the harm to the families caused by the death penalty.    
 Because of the fundamental nature of this right, the government may not infringe 
upon it unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  
The death penalty is not narrowly tailored because it fails to accomplish its purported 
penological interests of deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and restoration of moral 
order.  There are other punishments available, namely lengthy incarceration, including 
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life in prison without parole, that better accomplish the penological goals and do not 
destroy completely the family relationship.     
 It is time for courts to recognize the constitutional right of death row family 
members to preserve and protect their family relationships.   
 
